2019
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/ady053
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Land law reform in Kenya: Devolution, veto players, and the limits of an institutional fix

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Cited by 64 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…In Machakos County, conventional wisdom held that the governor worried that a CLMB would impede his desire to build a new city on public land (Watson, 2014). In other counties, governors and their assemblies failed to agree on the membership, with these fights being proxy battles related to political rivalries within the county (Boone et al, 2019). The unpopularity of CLMBs with some elected officials was coupled with lack of understanding by land professionals.…”
Section: Constitutional Reform and Land: The Realitymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…In Machakos County, conventional wisdom held that the governor worried that a CLMB would impede his desire to build a new city on public land (Watson, 2014). In other counties, governors and their assemblies failed to agree on the membership, with these fights being proxy battles related to political rivalries within the county (Boone et al, 2019). The unpopularity of CLMBs with some elected officials was coupled with lack of understanding by land professionals.…”
Section: Constitutional Reform and Land: The Realitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It explores the political economy of land in Kenya by examining incentives for and impediments to institutional change to attain better land management and long sought-after land justice. As with many of the governance and market reforms adopted throughout the Global South in recent decades, Kenya’s effort to streamline and rework land institutions was premised on ‘getting the incentives right’ (Boone et al, 2019; Malpezzi and Mayo, 1997). Incentivising behaviour, however, is extremely complicated in a sector as complex, dynamic and profitable as the land sector, which is characterised by multiple stakeholders who have diverse and even conflicting objectives relative to land.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This needs to be taken into account when thinking about how public policy can escape elite capture or diversion of resources to ensure policy implementation in the public interest. One clear example is in Kenyan land policy where critical redistributive and regulatory reforms often seem to be captured, derailed, or vetoed by powerful national and local actors (Klopp and Lumumba 2017;Boone et al 2019;Gargule and Lengoiboni 2020).…”
Section: Historical Legacy and Dependencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can be attributed to change in government regimes and the affiliated political insecurities. Narok region has been a hotbed of political rivalries and conflicts (Boone et at., 2019) owing to its metropolitan nature. There were political clashes in the region in 1997 and 2007 (following national general election polls).…”
Section: Background Information Concerning the Smesmentioning
confidence: 99%