1981
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90053-0
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Land rents, optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods

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Cited by 43 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…This will occur only when D 11 =0, a result rarely satisfied (see footnote 1). 8 This claim seems more plausible in view of Polinsky's results [16].…”
Section: Definition 2: Given C(·) () and U 0 Define R H ( ) Thementioning
confidence: 82%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…This will occur only when D 11 =0, a result rarely satisfied (see footnote 1). 8 This claim seems more plausible in view of Polinsky's results [16].…”
Section: Definition 2: Given C(·) () and U 0 Define R H ( ) Thementioning
confidence: 82%
“…Therefore, along a segment where the sign of T (x) remains constant, (8) indicates that ) (x is a linear function of x and increases (decreases) by t per unit distance. Thus ) (x is the shadow wage at locations of employment and in locations where industry does not exist ) (x equals the shadow wage minus commuting costs.…”
Section: The Social Optimum Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Some recent endogenous growth models have emphasized the role of productive fiscal policy as a determinant of persistent economic growth (Barro, 1990;Turnovsky, 2000Turnovsky, , 2004Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997;Gómez, 2008;and Park, 2009). As in Hochman (1981) and Wijkander (1984), this paper is concerned with provision of public goods. We assume that only the government is responsible for the provision of public goods.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%