Large outside blockholders as monitors: Evidence from partial acquisitions

Park, Yun W.; Selvili, Zekiye; Song, Moon H.

doi:10.1016/j.iref.2007.05.006

Cited by 35 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The estimated negative coefficient suggests that a concentrated structure improves efficiency. This is consistent with the discussion in Claessens et al (2002) and Park et al (2008) that large shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor management. Diversification of the firm, ORG SEGMENT , has a reasonable positive sign.…”

Section: 8155supporting

confidence: 90%

“…Third, for ORG CONCENT , Claessens et al (2002) and Park et al (2008) suggest that concentration in the stockholding structure has a positive effect on firm performance. They find that large shareholders have more incentives to monitor management and thus take a very important role in firm performance.…”

Section: Cost Functionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Weir 1997), with governance structure mainly construed as the structure of shareholding. For example, Park et al (2008) and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) suggest that large shareholders have an important role in monitoring performance. According to these studies, the benefit of monitoring outweighs the cost of monitoring for large shareholders, while the benefit is less for small shareholders.…”

Section: Determinants Of Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

Nakamura

2010

Rev Manag Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm's management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm's management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.

show abstract

Section: 8155supporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Cost Functionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Determinants Of Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

Nakamura

2010

Rev Manag Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Positively associated with takeover premiums Park, Selvili and Song (2008) Purchase of block by activist shareholder…”

Section: Concentration Of Stock Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

Hadani

Goranova

Khan

2011

Journal of Business Research

201

130

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…They presumably have the expertise and the resources to monitor, and meaningfully influence corporate actions and elect capable board members. Although Park, Selvili, and Song (2008) suggest that even activist blockholders are unlikely to successfully monitor an entrenched management. Government shareholders are federal, provincial or municipal governments or government agencies, government banks, development agencies, and firms owned by governments, such as utilities or natural resources companies.…”

Section: Ownership Concentration Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America

Cueto

2013

International Review of Economics & Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Large outside blockholders as monitors: Evidence from partial acquisitions

Cited by 35 publications

References 32 publications

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About