Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe

Kim, Kenneth; Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn; Nofsinger, John R.

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.09.001

Cited by 142 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…It's important to consider the specificity of the Tunisian context that firms are facing severe agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders (La Porta et al, ) and that the market is poorly regulated. Expropriation risk of minority shareholders is significant (Kim, Kitsabunnarat‐Chatjuthamard, & Nofsingeret, ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk‐taking?

Loukil¹,

Yousfi

2015

Can J Adm Sci

113

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We study the impact of board gender diversity on firm risk‐taking in a developing market. Our study is drawn from a sample of 30 Tunisian‐listed firms between 1997 and 2010. First, we found that women have a risk perception that leads to risk avoidance behaviour: the presence of women directors, even when there is one woman director, is positively associated with cash ratio. Second, we showed no significant relationship between board gender diversity and the propensity to take strategic or financial risk‐taking. Third, the presence of state officer/bureaucrats and/or politically connected women have a positive effect on cash holding and investment opportunities. Finally, we found that foreign investors do not invest in firms with gender‐diverse boards. We conclude with a discussion of contributions to scholarship and practice, and present avenues for future research. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk‐taking?

Loukil¹,

Yousfi

2015

Can J Adm Sci

113

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“…firms in countries with poor investor protection may need concentrated control on the other side, and better minority shareholder protection is associated with higher dividend pay-outs). Kim et al (2007) defend that countries with strong shareholder protection rights have firms with lower ownership concentrations and with more independent directors, dividend payouts availability and cost of external finance and market valuations. From this point of view, La Porta et al (2000) show that the legal environment shapes the value of the private benefits of control and, thereby, determines the equilibrium ownership structures.…”

Section: Literature Review and Recent Trends In Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Law Enforcement in Albanian Joint Stock Companies

Çipi¹,

Pulaj²,

Ismaili³

2016

IBR

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Proper implementation of CG regulations by the companies brings advantages both for companies and countries. Furthermore, the quality of legal rules determines the shape of the ownership concentration structure of the firm and, in many cases, assumes a monitoring role. In this sense for Albanian economy improving the use and enforcement of "good" CG practices will lead to higher foreign investment and soft passage towards modern economy. In this paper, we aim to analyze the evolutionary patterns of CG legal framework in Albania and, based on an application of the Delphi technique, provide development prospects considering the perceptions of a panel of Joint Stock Companies -JSCs-Chief Executive Officers -CEOs. Our essay demonstrates that CEOs expresses overall satisfaction with the CG legislation but its implementation isn't at the required levels. Additionally, larger gaps and variations exist in areas where regulations and guidelines are less demanding or enforcement is difficult.

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“…Being non-controlling minority shareholders does not mean that their role is any less significant. Some extant literature has proven that the roles of minority shareholders is significant [e.g., governance role, promote transparency, ethical practices, and good governance (Shkolnikov, 2006); a watchdog role (Mustafa, Latif, & Taliyang, 2011); largest group of shareholders and active participants in the stock market (Guan, 2005;Barber & Odean, 2007), and influencing board composition (Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 2007)]. …”

Section: Shareholder Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholder Activism in Malaysia: Is it Effective?

Othman

Borges

2015

Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Some recent developments associated with corporate governance and shareholder activism have shown that shareholder empowerment is vital nowadays. Hence, there is a dire need for minority shareholders to be more active and responsive in their dealings with corporations. Active shareholder engagement safeguards the interests and the rights of the minority shareholders from the effect of agency relationships and from the consequences of the unique atmosphere of shareholder activism in Malaysia. A conceptual discussion on shareholder activism has led to a conclusion that shareholder activism in developed countries cannot explain the state of activism in emerging economies, like Malaysia.

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Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe

Cited by 142 publications

References 47 publications

Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk‐taking?

Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk‐taking?

Corporate Governance and Law Enforcement in Albanian Joint Stock Companies

Shareholder Activism in Malaysia: Is it Effective?

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