“Law”

Coleman, Jules L.; Simchen, Ori

doi:10.1017/s1352325203000016

Cited by 17 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…It could not even be taken seriously if Pardo and Patterson are right. 10 We admit to being perplexed by these comments. Are they criticisms of our views?…”

Section: Robins and Craver On The Significance Of Empirical Bedrocks Anmentioning

confidence: 97%

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More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies

Pardo

Patterson

2010

Neuroethics

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At the invitation of the Editors, we wrote an article (entitled, “Minds, Brains, and Norms”) detailing our views on a variety of claims by those arguing for the explanatory power of neuroscience in matters of law and ethics. The Editors invited comments on our article from four distinguished academics (Walter Glannon, Carl Craver, Sarah Robins, and Thomas Nadelhoffer) and invited our reply to their critique of our views. In this reply to our commentators, we correct some potential misunderstandings of our views and further clarify our positions with discussions of the conceptual-empirical distinction, rule-following, explanations at the personal and subpersonal levels, memory, and lie detection. Although we acknowledge many of the criticisms advanced by our distinguished colleagues, we conclude that, in several important respects, their criticisms confirm the points made in our original article

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“…It could not even be taken seriously if Pardo and Patterson are right. 10 We admit to being perplexed by these comments. Are they criticisms of our views?…”

Section: Robins and Craver On The Significance Of Empirical Bedrocks Anmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…See[10]. It is also the case that "people on the street" sometimes say nonsensical things about law.…”

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confidence: 99%

More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies

Pardo

Patterson

2010

Neuroethics

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“…As Ori Simchen and I demonstrate in Law (Coleman and Simchen 2003) Dworkin's semantic sting argument is invalid and unsound at best, and probably a non‐sequitur as well. In the first place, it draws a conclusion about the criteria for “law” from an insight about the criteria of law.…”

Section: From Doubts About Conventions To Doubts About Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

Coleman

2009

Ratio Juris

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In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal positivism. The second is inessential to legal positivism. The third is likely inessential to law. I then characterize the central claim of ILP in a way that relies on none of these: ILP is the claim that necessarily social facts determine the determinants of legal content. I show that ILP so conceived leaves the central debates in law largely untouched. I suggest how the most fundamental of these-the question of the normativity of law-at least can be usefully addressed. The essay closes by suggesting that even though one can distinguish the social from the normative dimensions of law, a theory of the nature of law is necessarily an account of the relationship between the two: It is a theory either of the difference that certain distinctive social facts make in normative space, or it is an account of the distinctive normative difference that law makes, and the social and other facts that are necessary to explain that difference. One can distinguish between but one cannot separate the social from the normative aspects of legality.

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“….] disagreement among experts—namely, judges, lawyers, and jurisprudents—about what law is is a salient feature of our linguistic and legal practices” (Coleman and Simchen 2003, 22).…”

Section: Examples Of Subjectivity In Selecting Fields Of Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjectivity and Law's Fields of Enquiry*

Donnelly

2007

Ratio Juris

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Despite some appearances to the contrary, a popular view in jurisprudence is that there is a limited domain which either constitutes the field of enquiry of law or at least delineates the arena from which a particular field of enquiry ought to be selected. This article argues that "law" is comprised of a number of fields of enquiry that may be and are selected subjectively. It is claimed that theories of law may be freed from the perceived need to provide authoritative justification for their field of enquiry, if the role of subjectivity is acknowledged appropriately.

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“Law”

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies

More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

Subjectivity and Law's Fields of Enquiry*

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