Abstract:In this paper we discuss how Causal Decision Theory should be modified to handle a class of problematic cases involving deterministic laws. Causal Decision Theory, as it stands, is problematically biased against your endorsing deterministic propositions (for example it tells you to deny Newtonian physics, regardless of how confident you are of its truth). Our response is that this is not a problem for Causal Decision Theory per se, but arises because of the standard method for assessing the truth of certain co… Show more
“…In this section, I'll show that my theory gets the right answer in those cases. (After seeing this, it should also be obvious how my theory handles analogous deterministic cases, like those recently discussed by Williamson and Sandgren (forthcoming), Gallow (2022), Kment (2023), and others.) I'll also show that my theory gives the two‐boxing recommendation in Newcomb .…”
Section: Cases Reduxmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…However, philosophers sympathetic to that theory are divided about how to respond. For example, some say that we should modify CDT's decision rule (Sandgren and Williamson, 2020; Williamson and Sandgren, forthcoming; Solomon, MS). Others say that we should adopt a new semantics for counterfactuals (Gallow, 2022).…”
Section: Counterfactuals Context and Causationmentioning
The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice you make—were different in the present, either the laws would be violated or the distant past would be changed. And as several authors have shown, it's easy to transform this upshot of the standard theory of counterfactuals into full‐blown counterexamples to CDT. In response to these counterexamples, I argue here that the problem lies, not so much with CDT's guiding idea—that it's the expected causal consequences of your actions that matter for rational decision‐making—but with the fact that the classic formulation of CDT doesn't pay sufficient attention to the context‐sensitivity of counterfactuals. I develop a contextualist version of CDT which better accounts for this context‐sensitivity. And I show that my theory avoids the problems faced by the classic formulation of CDT in determinstic worlds.
“…In this section, I'll show that my theory gets the right answer in those cases. (After seeing this, it should also be obvious how my theory handles analogous deterministic cases, like those recently discussed by Williamson and Sandgren (forthcoming), Gallow (2022), Kment (2023), and others.) I'll also show that my theory gives the two‐boxing recommendation in Newcomb .…”
Section: Cases Reduxmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…However, philosophers sympathetic to that theory are divided about how to respond. For example, some say that we should modify CDT's decision rule (Sandgren and Williamson, 2020; Williamson and Sandgren, forthcoming; Solomon, MS). Others say that we should adopt a new semantics for counterfactuals (Gallow, 2022).…”
Section: Counterfactuals Context and Causationmentioning
The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice you make—were different in the present, either the laws would be violated or the distant past would be changed. And as several authors have shown, it's easy to transform this upshot of the standard theory of counterfactuals into full‐blown counterexamples to CDT. In response to these counterexamples, I argue here that the problem lies, not so much with CDT's guiding idea—that it's the expected causal consequences of your actions that matter for rational decision‐making—but with the fact that the classic formulation of CDT doesn't pay sufficient attention to the context‐sensitivity of counterfactuals. I develop a contextualist version of CDT which better accounts for this context‐sensitivity. And I show that my theory avoids the problems faced by the classic formulation of CDT in determinstic worlds.
“…Nevertheless, adopting (6) does not help ECV‐Maxists, since ECV‐Max‐cum‐(6) confronts its own counterexamples, including a case described by Williamson and Sandgren (2021: §5.1.1) and the following example. Law‐Bet 2 .…”
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