Law Books and Books about Law

Abel, Richard; Rheinstein, Max

doi:10.2307/1227916

Cited by 44 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…It is no more surprising that there is a gap between L&S manifestoes and practice than that there is one between law on the books and law in action (Abel 1973b). What did LSR actually publish in its formative years?…”

Section: Early Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…They documented deviation from formal rules in criminal courts, civil commitment of the mentally ill, the Polish command economy, and German bankruptcy. I criticized such "gap" studies (Abel 1973b) for allowing law to define problems for social science. It was naive to expect homology between legal prescriptions and behavior, unproductive to keep falsifying that assumption, and ethically unacceptable to adopt uncritically the norms of positive law.…”

Section: Early Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…I suggested that the collapse of the liberal paradigm might explain why the literature surveys in this special issue (Volume 14, Number 3) were "macrosocial, historical, and comparative," unlike most LSR articles. I repeated my criticism of "gap" studies (Abel 1973b), suggesting instead that we ask about a law: "What are its inadvertent consequences or symbolic meanings? What are its costs?…”

Section: The Middle Yearsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Law and Society: Project and Practice

Abel

2010

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci.

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Section: Early Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Early Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Middle Yearsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Law and Society: Project and Practice

Abel

2010

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci.

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“…Wald, 1976), it is making complex psychological judgments. Such judgments can be scrutinized through comparison with existing psy-"For a critical discussion of approaches to law and social science that limit themselves to the exploration of this "gap," see Abel (1973) and Feeley (1976). I am not suggesting that psychologists make this discrepancy their exclusive focus, only that they extend their analysis at least that far.…”

Section: B Closing the Gap Between Psychological Fact And Legal Fictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychology and legal change: On the limits of a factual jurisprudence.

Haney¹

1980

Law and Human Behavior

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Law and Human Behavior.http://www.jstor.org From its inception, research in "law and psychology" has had an explicitly applied focus. In large part, psychologists have studied legal issues and participated as experts in the legal process in order to improve law and enhance the quality of its justice. This article examines whether and how this can be done. A taxonomy of relationships between the two disciplines is presented which characterizes law and psychology research in terms of its potential for legal change. The use of psychology to effect legal change requires a bringing together of both psychological and legal paradigms. But important differences exist between the styles and methods of reasoning, proof, and justification in psychology and law. The implications of those differences for the use of psychological data in legal change efforts are developed, as are other aspects of "legalism" that may hinder or impede the effectiveness of psychologically oriented law reform. Finally, limitations of a "factual jurisprudence" that derive from the nature of psychological data are examined.

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“…Abel (1973) published a strong critique of the idea that the gap is problematic, suggesting that there is no reason to think that legal rules and legal behavior would be consistent and that the preoccupation of social scientists with the gap distracts from the construction of a social theory of law. Abel (1973) published a strong critique of the idea that the gap is problematic, suggesting that there is no reason to think that legal rules and legal behavior would be consistent and that the preoccupation of social scientists with the gap distracts from the construction of a social theory of law.…”

Section: The Gapmentioning

confidence: 99%