Laws of Nature

Dretske, Fred

doi:10.1086/288741

Cited by 777 publications

(152 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…So, even though the logical form of a law-like sentence is the same as that of an accidental universal sentence, we point to the connection between law-like sentences and generics. In the literature there has been attempts to distinguish 'law-like' (nomologic, nomothetic) generalisations from 'accidental' generalisations (see, e.g., Goodman 1983;Hempel 1965), and early steps to break the logical emphasis were taken by for example Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1978Armstrong ( , 1983 who focused on laws as relations of non-logical necessitation between universals (see also Carroll 2016).…”

Section: Induction From the Perspective Of Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Induction and knowledge-what

Gärdenfors

Stephens

2017

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.

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Section: Induction From the Perspective Of Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Induction and knowledge-what

Gärdenfors

Stephens

2017

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…First, if anything remotely like Lewis's 'best systems' account of laws is right, then instances of (3) plausibly will qualify as laws in radium-containing worlds at which T 0 is true: they are simple, and they are very informative. Second, the best-known non-Lewisian account of law, that due to Armstrong ([1983]), Dretske ([1977]) and Tooley ([1977]) -henceforth 'ADT'-is unthreatening. ADT hold that it is a law that all Fs are Gs just in case a relation of necessitation holds between corresponding universals, Fness and Gness.…”

Section: Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finite Frequentism in a Big World

Tosh¹

2016

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The view that chances are relative frequencies of occurrence within actual, finite reference classes has long been written off. I argue that it ought to be reconsidered. Focussing on non-deterministic chance, I defend a version of finite frequentism in which reference classmates are required to have qualitatively identical pasts. While my analysis can evade or resist several standard objections, it has a counterintuitive consequence: non-trivial chances entail the existence of light cones that are perfect intrinsic duplicates. In mitigation, I argue that our scientific knowledge is consistent with the hypothesis that there are many such duplicates in the actual world. Moreover, my analysis has some striking advantages: it is simple, it is metaphysically undemanding, and it makes possible a satisfying explanation of the chance-credence connection.

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“…Another alternative is then to adopt the externalist conception of laws defended by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1983) (hereafter DTA).…”

Section: Nomological Realism: Essences and Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysical status of natural laws: A critique of Stephen Mumford’s Nomological Antirealism

Borge

2015

Filosofia Unisinos

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The issues of laws of nature and the modality underlying natural regularity have often been treated as one. Metaphysical analysis shows, however, that only those positions that assume an ontological commitment to laws of nature can be considered within Nomological Realism (NR). Mumford (2004) proposes an alternative to NR compatible with the modal commitments commonly associated with realist positions. In this view, the weight of modality is not set on laws but on properties -understood in terms of powers and propensities. A Realist Lawlessness (RL), according to his own nomenclature. In this paper I aim to show, first, that Mumford's arguments against NR do not justify its rejection. Second, I argue that the dispositional metaphysic of RL leads at least to the same problems as NR.Keywords: laws of nature, scientific laws, Nomological Realism, Stephen Mumford. ResumoAs questões das leis da natureza e da modalidade subjacente à regularidade natural muitas vezes têm sido tratadas como uma só. No entanto, a análise metafísica mostra que só as posições que assumem um compromisso ontológico com as leis da natureza podem ser consideradas dentro do Realismo Nomológico (RN). Mumford (2004)

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Laws of Nature

Cited by 777 publications

References 7 publications

Induction and knowledge-what

Induction and knowledge-what

Finite Frequentism in a Big World

The metaphysical status of natural laws: A critique of Stephen Mumford’s Nomological Antirealism

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