Le financement des PME en Tunisie

Adair, Philippe; Fhima, Fredj

doi:10.7202/1024521ar

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…More precisely, Tunisian banks usually respond positively to any loan demand by large enterprises and always apply their strict requirements to any loan demand by SMEs, despite receiving acceptable financial statements. Adair and Fhima (2013) provide evidence for the period of 2001-2006 that the amount of bank loans provided to SMEs are far from their expressed financing needs. This lack was justified by the inability of SMEs to fulfill the excessive cost of financing and provide the real guarantees imposed by banks.…”

Section: Table 5 Comparison Of Average Original and Bias-corrected Technical Efficiency Of Banks By Type Of Ownership Before And After Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

What explains the technical efficiency of banks in Tunisia? Evidence from a two-stage data envelopment analysis

Jelassi

Delhoumi

2021

Financ Innov

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In this study we examine the potential determinants of technical efficiency for the Tunisian commercial banking sector over the period of 1995–2017. First, we estimate banking technical efficiency with a radial and non-radial bootstrap data envelopment analysis. For the radial technique, we use an input-oriented approach and for non-radial we use the Range Adjusted Measure (RAM). Second, we use a double bootstrapping regression technique to estimate the influence of a set of eventual determinants on technical efficiency. Finally, based on all possible regressions, we gauge the overall effect of each determinant. Our results reveal that the input-oriented and RAM approach gave somewhat similar results. We found that the return on equity, the expense to income ratio, the loan to deposit ratio, and the growth rate are insignificant to Tunisian banking technical efficiency. In particular, banking technical efficiency increases with capitalization and inflation, whereas, it decreases with size, number of bank branches, management to staff ratio, and loan to asset ratio. In addition, we identified evidence supporting the moderate success of the last decade of reforms and a noticeable one for the post-revolution reforms in helping improve banking technical efficiency. The post-revolution reforms, largely revolving around reinforcing the rules of good governance and banking supervision, coupled with the restructuring of public banks, were found to be insufficient to raise overall banking technical efficiency despite improvement in the technical efficiency of private banks.

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Section: Table 5 Comparison Of Average Original and Bias-corrected Technical Efficiency Of Banks By Type Of Ownership Before And After Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

What explains the technical efficiency of banks in Tunisia? Evidence from a two-stage data envelopment analysis

Jelassi

Delhoumi

2021

Financ Innov

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“…First, some of the proxy variables are endogenous because they result from firm decisions (e.g., capital structure) and thus are not appropriate measures of credit rationing. Second, the classification is rigid, ignoring the mobility of firms from the group of constrained companies to that of the unconstrained ones and vice versa (Adair & Fhima, 2013).…”

Section: Empirical Measures Of Credit Rationingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The estimation of a disequilibrium model is carried out in three steps (Maddala, 1983;Steijvers, 2008;Adair & Fhima, 2013;Alexandre & Buisson-Stéphan, 2014). The first step concerns the estimation of the coefficients of each explanatory variable of the supply and demand equations.…”

Section: The Disequilibrium Model: Demand and Supply Of Bank Creditmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A company is rationed in year t if the probability that the desired demand for credit exceeding the amount granted in the same year is beyond 0.5 (Gersovitz, 1980). This estimation method World Journal of Applied Economics 2020(1) allows a switch between rationing and non-rationing regimes: a non-rationed enterprise in one year could be rationed another year (Atanasova & Wilson, 2004;Adair & Fhima, 2013). In Table 7, once the companies are classified for every year according to the rationed vs non-rationed regimes, we calculate the share of rationed SMEs over the total sample.…”

Section: Share Of Smes Rationed On the Credit Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model

Adair

Adaskou

2020

WJAE

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A conventional assumption that deserves testing is that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are most affected by credit crunch. In this respect, a disequilibrium model is designed to analyse the determinants of credit rationing upon a balanced panel of 2,370 mature French SMEs over the period 2002-2010. According to the estimates of simultaneous equations, the desired demand for bank credit is determined by exogenous factors from the supply-side. The credit supply-side validates best trade-off theory, whereas the credit demand-side validates best pecking order theory. The average share of rationed SMEs is seven per cent of the sample, suggesting that access to bank loans is not a major issue for mature French SMEs.

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“…In Tunisia, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are often exposed to credit rationing because banks consider them as opaque and risky entities (Adair & Fhima, 2013;Mouley & Hassen, 2017). By rationing credit to SMEs, Tunisian banks have lost strategic clients, given their importance in the Tunisian enterprises fabric (INS, Business Directory), while they can do otherwise and engage in a long-term relationship for the collection of specific information about these enterprises and the help in credit decision-making (Harhoff & Körting, 1998;Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003;Agarwal & Hauswald, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Loan Officer and the Evolution of Bank-SMEs Relationship in Tunisia

Fhima¹,

Trabelsi²

2021

IJEF

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This paper empirically investigates the role of the loan officer in the evolution of the bank-SMEs relationship and its motivation for studying credit demand, its level of alignment to the hierarchy and its participation in the decision-making process. Based on a survey of 160 loan officers from two large Tunisian commercial banks: the ‘Société Tunisienne de Banque’ (STB) – as a public bank, and the ‘Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie’ (BIAT) – as a private bank, data analysis shows that self-esteem, need for success, autonomy in performing duties, and participation in the decision-making process are motivating factors at work for loan officers at both banks. The number of visits to the premises of the SME and the average length of interviews with its manager are considered important for the acquisition of soft information. Regarding the decision-making power, while a certain delegation has been instituted at the regional level in the BIAT, it is more the responsibility of the central committees in the STB. The decision of evolution depends more on the hierarchical superiors in a private bank that is why the BIAT officers are closer to their superiors than those of the STB.

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Le financement des PME en Tunisie

Cited by 7 publications

References 64 publications

What explains the technical efficiency of banks in Tunisia? Evidence from a two-stage data envelopment analysis

What explains the technical efficiency of banks in Tunisia? Evidence from a two-stage data envelopment analysis

Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model

Loan Officer and the Evolution of Bank-SMEs Relationship in Tunisia

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