Leadership ethical orientations, mindfulness and procurement contract performance in the COMESA central governments

Abstract

ABSTRACT. In this study, we seek to examine the prevalence and relationships between constructs of mindfulness, task autonomy, Interfunctional coordination, teamwork, contract implementation and monitoring which have been largely ignored or not fully explored in previous empirical research; and attempt to use them to predict contract performance. The paper uses descriptive and analytical research designs guided by multimethods qualitative and quantitative research approaches to collect and analyze data predicting contract performance in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) member states. Data was collected from a representative sample of 10 countries and subsequent sampling was done at the government ministries. Contracts were the unit of analysis as suggested by Brousseau and Glachant (2002).The study findings reveal that deontology, mindfulness procurement task performance, competence of the procurement staff, inter-functional coordination and teamwork, mindfulness, task autonomy, Inter-functional coordination, teamwork, contract implementation and monitoring for contract implementation and monitoring significantly and positively predict contract performance. Contrary to our expectation, teleology ethical orientation and autonomy of procurement staff significantly and negatively predicted contract performance. These findings have both policy and managerial implications which we present. Lastly, we recognize the virtue of ethical orientation of PDE leadership which resides in deontology and teleology that has been largely ignored in previous contract performance research. Paralleling previous empirical studies, the study brings together constructs of mindfulness, task autonomy, Inter-functional coordination and teamwork, contract implementation and monitoring in predicting contract performance in a large regional sub-Saharan market of the common market for eastern and southern Africa (COMESA).

Institutional pressures and procurement cycle time in Uganda’s central government procuring and disposing entities: the mediating role of opportunistic behavior

“…However, as Ntayi et al (2013) observed, Ugandan PDEs wield so much power that its leaders take advantage of to twist procurement rules and guidelines to favor their selfish interests. At times, procurement actors in some PDEs manipulate the procurement legislation to accommodate their self-interest.…”

“…Lambsdorff and Nell (2005) cautioned that legislations can be crafted in a way to foster opportunism. Ntayi et al (2013) emphasized that Ugandan PDEs wield so much power, which its leaders take advantage of, to twist procurement rules and guidelines to favor their selfish interests. Underbidding is rampant in public procurement where bidders engage in misleading and deceptive behavior by making unrealistic or even false promises to win contracts in public procurement.…”

“…There are also delays by the Contracts Committee to approve documents (PPDA, 2016a). In public procurement, the top leadership and procurement personnel are required to make decisions based on the procurement rules, laws and regulations, which substitute their judgment, thus lengthening the procurement process (Ntayi et al , 2013). Whereas the PPDA Act 2003 and PPDA Regulations 2014 require bidders to submit bid security for open bidding, some PDEs at times relax on this requirement or fail to verify it, and as such, PDEs fail to weed out unsecure bidders who tend to waste time, hence delaying the procurement process (PPDA, 2017e, 2018a).…”

“…Hence, behavior like giving false information, forging documents, telling lies, discriminating providers and conspiracy in the procurement cycle is minimal where there is high level of transparency and caution against those who flout procurement regulations. However, as Ntayi et al (2013) observed, Ugandan PDEs wield so much power that its leaders take advantage of to twist procurement rules and guidelines to favor their selfish interests. At times, procurement actors in some PDEs manipulate the procurement legislation to accommodate their self-interest.…”

The Role of Leadership in Organizational Implementation and Sustainment in Service Agencies

“…Often decisions about the nature of services to be implemented goes through a vetting process that may include system, community-based organization, consumer, and advocacy input. In addition, the ways in which leaders engage in multiple aspects of procurement and contracting process can influence contract performance (Mpeera Ntayi, Ngoboka, Ndahiro, & Eyaa, 2013). Leadership is important in the outer context to drive procurement and contracting process; however, the interconnections and relationships between outer and inner context actors are likely also critical for the quality and sustainment of services.…”