Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Searchable Encryption

Cash, David M.; Grubbs, Paul; Perry, Jason; Ristenpart, Thomas

doi:10.1145/2810103.2813700

Cited by 456 publications

(444 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Cash et al [6] generalize this approach by suggesting a classification of most existing SE schemes based on their leakage profile. To this end they define four profiles named from L1, that reveals the least information, to L4 that reveals the most information.…”

Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, w n } be the set of all keywords as in L2, the information contained in the L3 profile can be represented as: We now quickly recall the main existing leakageabuse attacks. An attack named "count attack" targeting the L1 profile is presented in [6]. The prior knowledge required by the count attack consists in the probability of co-occurrence of keywords (for instance "New" is very likely to occur if "York" is present) as well as the number of indices containing each keyword.…”

Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since L3 reveals the order of keywords and their occurrence patterns, the CSP is able for each keyword in a known document to see where this keyword occurs in other documents. Active attacks, for instance where the adversary can plant arbitrary documents in the system, were also presented by Cash et al [6,Section 5.2] and by Zhang et al [32], but we only consider passive attacks in this paper.…”

Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular it is commonly accepted that schemes leak the access pattern, denoting the ids of files that match a query, since doing so allows to search in sub-linear time [9]. As a consequence a large number of attacks on SE systems [6,12,15,32] focus on access pattern leakage in order to affect the largest possible set of schemes. However each scheme tends to have its own specific leakage, often including but not limited to the access pattern.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Rompay

Molva

Önen

2017

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Searchable Encryption (SE) allows a user to upload data to the cloud and to search it in a remote fashion while preserving the privacy of both the data and the queries. Recent research results describe attacks on SE schemes using the access pattern, denoting the ids of documents matching search queries, which most SE schemes reveal during query processing. However SE schemes usually leak more than just the access pattern, and this extra leakage can lead to attacks (much) more harmful than the ones using basic access pattern leakage only. We remark that in the special case of Multi-User Searchable Encryption (MUSE), where many users upload and search data in a cloud-based infrastructure, a large number of existing solutions have a common leakage in addition to the well-studied access pattern leakage. We show that this seemingly small extra leakage allows a very simple yet powerful attack, and that the privacy degree of the affected schemes have been overestimated. We also show that this new vulnerability affects existing software. Finally we formalize the newly identified leakage profile and show how it relates to previously defined ones.

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Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Existing Leakage Profile Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Rompay

Molva

Önen

2017

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…Commercial systems that also provide searchable encryption include Skyhigh Networks [13], CipherCloud [14] and Bitglass [15]. These systems use a simple SSE approach, such as attaching keyword tokens to an encrypted document, as stated in [16]. We remark that all these systems focus on outsourcing to a single storage provider.…”

Section: Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Searchable Data Vault: Encrypted Queries in Secure Distributed Cloud Storage

et al. 2017

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Cloud storage services allow users to efficiently outsource their documents anytime and anywhere. Such convenience, however, leads to privacy concerns. While storage providers may not read users' documents, attackers may possibly gain access by exploiting vulnerabilities in the storage system. Documents may also be leaked by curious administrators. A simple solution is for the user to encrypt all documents before submitting them. This method, however, makes it impossible to efficiently search for documents as they are all encrypted. To resolve this problem, we propose a multi-server searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme and construct a system called the searchable data vault (SDV). A unique feature of the scheme is that it allows an encrypted document to be divided into blocks and distributed to different storage servers so that no single storage provider has a complete document. By incorporating the scheme, the SDV protects the privacy of documents while allowing for efficient private queries. It utilizes a web interface and a controller that manages user credentials, query indexes and submission of encrypted documents to cloud storage services. It is also the first system that enables a user to simultaneously outsource and privately query documents from a few cloud storage services. Our preliminary performance evaluation shows that this feature introduces acceptable computation overheads when compared to submitting documents directly to a cloud storage service.

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Searchable encryption: A survey on privacy‐preserving search schemes on encrypted outsourced data

Handa

Krishna

Aggarwal

2019

Concurrency and Computation

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Outsourcing confidential data to cloud storage leads to privacy challenges that can be reduced using encryption. However, with encryption in place, the utilization of the data is reduced, which leads to reduced quality of experience of the users. To overcome this, searchable encryption (SE) schemes are utilized, which allow the end users to retrieve the relevant documents from the cloud, for which various researchers have worked utilizing different techniques. Despite the popularity of the searchable encryption schemes, most of the surveys either do not provide or present an incomplete taxonomy of SE schemes. Hence, in this paper, we attempt to present a complete taxonomy/classification of the searchable encryption schemes in terms of the type of search, type of index, results retrieved, implementation type, multiplicity of users, and the technique used. From the literature, it is observed that inner product similarity is widely adopted by researchers to compute the similarity of the query and the document index as it provides both conjunctive and disjunctive searching (ie, have better search capability) but requires high search time (ie, have lower search efficiency). On the other hand, schemes based on binary comparisons exist, which require less search time (ie, have better search efficiency) but support only conjunctive searching (ie, have limited search capability). Thus, a major conclusion drawn from our work is that there is an imbalance between search capability and search efficiency, ie, in the existing schemes, search capability can be improved at the cost of search time only. Therefore, we suggest that one direction where researchers should work on is to provide a balance between search capability and search efficiency.

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Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Searchable Encryption

Cited by 456 publications

References 12 publications

A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Searchable Data Vault: Encrypted Queries in Secure Distributed Cloud Storage

Searchable encryption: A survey on privacy‐preserving search schemes on encrypted outsourced data

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