Leakage‐resilient certificate‐based encryption

Yu, Qihong; Li, Jiguo; Zhang, Yichen

doi:10.1002/sec.1258

Cited by 35 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In Sun et al (2015), they present the first leakage-resilient wicked identity-based encryption (wicked IBE) scheme. Yu et al (2015) present a leakage-resilient certificate-based encryption (LR-CBE) scheme with the relative leakage ratio almost amounts to 1.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public key encryption secure against related-key attacks and key-leakage attacks from extractable hash proofs

Liu

Guo

2015

J Ambient Intell Human Comput

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Public-key encryption (PKE) can be used in cloud system to protect data in data sharing, identity authentication, etc. However, the security model of traditional PKE does not capture the ''key-leakage attacks'' which can leak partial information about the secret key. Also, the adversary can inject fault to tamper with the secret key and observe the output of the public key encryption scheme under this modified key which is called ''related-key attack''. In this paper, we present a method to construct public key encryption schemes secure against both weak key-leakage attacks and affine related-key attacks directly from extractable hash proof systems. Specifically, we first add Key Homomorphism and Fingerprinting properties to all-but-one (ABO) extractable hash proofs and construct a key encapsulation mechanism scheme secure against related-key attacks via it and thus public key encryption scheme secure against related-key attacks. Also, we prove that if the based ABOextractable hash proof with Key Homomorphism and Fingerprinting properties is weak leakage-resilient, then the key encapsulation mechanism scheme constructed from it is weak leakage-resilient and related-key attack secure.Moreover, we propose a public key encryption scheme secure against affine related-key attacks based on lattice.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public key encryption secure against related-key attacks and key-leakage attacks from extractable hash proofs

Liu

Guo

2015

J Ambient Intell Human Comput

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“…Therefore, leakage‐resilient cryptography schemes are important to meet the security requirements in the real world. However, most previous leakage‐resilient cryptography schemes [1–13] only consider the bounded leakage attacks and do not allow any continuous leakage. In the real world, the leakage is unbounded, because of the adversary can continuously learn some additional information on the private key of the user, and can trivially break the security of cryptography scheme under the continuous leakage attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity‐based encryption resilient to continuous key leakage

Zhou

Yang

et al. 2019

IET Information Security

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“…In addition, CBC also addresses the key escrow and distribution problems. In recent years, CBC has attracted much attention in academic circle and a lot of cryptographic schemes [19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36] (includeing many certificate-based encryption (CBE) and certificate-based signature (CBS) schemes) have been proposed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Forward-Secure Certificate-Based Signature Scheme with Enhanced Security in the Standard Model

Lu¹,

Li²

2019

KSII TIIS

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Leakage of secret keys may be the most devastating problem in public key cryptosystems because it means that all security guarantees are missing. The forward security mechanism allows users to update secret keys frequently without updating public keys. Meanwhile, it ensures that an attacker is unable to derive a user's secret keys for any past time, even if it compromises the user's current secret key. Therefore, it offers an effective cryptographic approach to address the private key leakage problem. As an extension of the forward security mechanism in certificate-based public key cryptography, forward-secure certificate-based signature (FS-CBS) has many appealing merits, such as no key escrow, no secure channel and implicit authentication. Until now, there is only one FS-CBS scheme that does not employ the random oracles. Unfortunately, our cryptanalysis indicates that the scheme is subject to the security vulnerability due to the existential forgery attack from the malicious CA. Our attack demonstrates that a CA can destroy its existential unforgeability by implanting trapdoors in system parameters without knowing the target user's secret key. Therefore, it is fair to say that to design a FS-CBS scheme secure against malicious CAs without lying random oracles is still an unsolved issue. To address this problem, we put forward an enhanced FS-CBS scheme without random oracles. Our FS-CBS scheme not only fixes the security weakness in the original scheme, but also significantly optimizes the scheme efficiency. In the standard model, we formally prove its security under the complexity assumption of the square computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In addition, the comparison with the original FS-CBS scheme shows that our scheme offers stronger security guarantee and enjoys better performance.

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Leakage‐resilient certificate‐based encryption

Cited by 35 publications

References 45 publications

Public key encryption secure against related-key attacks and key-leakage attacks from extractable hash proofs

Public key encryption secure against related-key attacks and key-leakage attacks from extractable hash proofs

Identity‐based encryption resilient to continuous key leakage

A Forward-Secure Certificate-Based Signature Scheme with Enhanced Security in the Standard Model

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