Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land

Wang, Wenhao; Chen, Guoxing; Pan, Xiaorui; Zhang, Yinqian; Wang, Xiaofeng; Bindschaedler, Vincent; Tang, Haixu; Gunter, Carl A.

doi:10.1145/3133956.3134038

Cited by 209 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Despite the security mechanisms employed by the Intel SGX technology, it does not cover side-channel attacks. Wang et al [60] presented four sidechannel attack vectors that SGX offers no protection: power statistics, cache miss statistics, branch timing, and page accesses via page tables. Data access patterns and physical attacks against the CPU, such as fault injection or reprogramming of machine code functionalities, are also not covered by the SGX threat model [9,13].…”

Section: Intel Sgx Security Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trusted Client-Side Encryption for Cloud Storage

Rocha

Valadares

Perkusich

et al. 2021

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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Nowadays, users are delegating the data storage to cloud services, due to the virtually unlimited storage, change history, broadband connection, and high availability. Despite the benefits and facilities, it is necessary to pay extra attention to data confidentiality and users' privacy, as numerous threats aim to collect such information in an unauthorized manner. An approach to ensure data confidentiality is the use of client-side encryption, with the user taking control of the encryption keys and defining which files or data will be encrypted. This scheme is already explored by many applications on personal computers and also as a native feature in some smartphone operating systems, but are still susceptible to certain types of attacks. Aiming to improve the security of the client-side encryption approach, we propose to apply the Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to perform data sealing, creating a secure vault that can be synchronized with any cloud storage service, while relying on the SGX to protect the key handling. To validate our proposal, we build a proof of concept based on the Cryptomator application, an open-source client-side encryption tool specially designed for cloud storage services. Our results show an overall performance better than the original Cryptomator application, with stronger security premises. Thus, our solution proved to be feasible and can be expanded and refined for practical use and integration with cloud synchronization services.

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Section: Intel Sgx Security Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trusted Client-Side Encryption for Cloud Storage

Rocha

Valadares

Perkusich

et al. 2021

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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“…We do not consider side-channel attacks in this paper. Side-channel attacks have been shown to be a real threat, especially to Intel SGX [22,25,58]. This field is moving fast: new attacks have been kept being proposed, so have new defenses [45,51].…”

Section: Threat Model and Security Goalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Occlum

Shen

Tian

Chen

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Syste

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Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and hardware attacks outside the enclaves. Recent work introduces library operating systems (LibOSes) to SGX so that legacy applications can run inside enclaves with few or even no modifications. As virtually any non-trivial application demands multiple processes, it is essential for LibOSes to support multitasking. However, none of the existing SGX LibOSes support multitasking both securely and efficiently.This paper presents Occlum, a system that enables secure and efficient multitasking on SGX. We implement the LibOS processes as SFI-Isolated Processes (SIPs). SFI is a software instrumentation technique for sandboxing untrusted modules (called domains). We design a novel SFI scheme named MPXbased, Multi-Domain SFI (MMDSFI) and leverage MMDSFI to enforce the isolation of SIPs. We also design an independent verifier to ensure the security guarantees of MMDSFI. With SIPs safely sharing the single address space of an enclave,

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“…Moghimi, Irazoqui, and Eisenbarth [MIE17] introduced the CacheZoom attack, showing how the libgcrypt AES implementation leaks when running inside an Intel SGX enclave. On the other hand, Van Bulck et al [VB+17] and Wang et al [Wan+17] tested the side-channel resistance of the libgcrypt EdDSA implementation hardened with Intel SGX.…”

Section: Side-channel Attack On Libgcrypt Beeamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, the controlled-channels attack proposed by Xu, Cui, and Peinado [XCP15] provides access to the sequence of memory pages executed by the victim enclave, providing a leakage source of 4 KB granularity that can be used to track the enclave execution [Wan+17,Shi+16,VB+17,WSB18]. This attack relies on Intel SGX which leaves control of its memory pages to the untrusted OS.…”

Section: Side-channel Attack On Libgcrypt Beeamentioning

confidence: 99%

From A to Z: Projective coordinates leakage in the wild

Aldaya

García

Brumley

2020

TCHES

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At EUROCRYPT 2004, Naccache et al. showed that the projective coordinates representation of the resulting point of an elliptic curve scalar multiplication potentially allows to recover some bits of the scalar. However, this attack has received little attention by the scientific community, and the status of deployed mitigations to prevent it in widely adopted cryptography libraries is unknown. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap, by analyzing several cryptography libraries in this context. To demonstrate the applicability of the attack, we use a side-channel attack to exploit this vulnerability within libgcrypt in the context of ECDSA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practical attack instance. It targets the insecure binary extended Euclidean algorithm implementation using a microarchitectural side-channel attack that allows recovering the projective representation of the output point of scalar multiplication during ECDSA signature generation. We captured 100k traces to estimate the number of traces an attacker would need to compromise the libgcrypt ECDSA implementation, resulting in less than 2k for commonly used elliptic curve secp256r1, demonstrating the attack feasibility. During exploitation, we found two additional vulnerabilities. However, we remark the purpose of this paper is not merely exploiting a library but about providing an analysis on the projective coordinates vulnerability status in widely deployed open-source libraries, filling a gap between its original description in the academic literature and the adoption of countermeasures to thwart it in real-world applications.

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Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land

Cited by 209 publications

References 27 publications

Trusted Client-Side Encryption for Cloud Storage

Trusted Client-Side Encryption for Cloud Storage

Occlum

From A to Z: Projective coordinates leakage in the wild

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