Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System

Deltas, George; Herrera, Helios; Polborn, Mattias

doi:10.1093/restud/rdv055

Cited by 8 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…To our knowledge, the only models of dynamic primaries as contests between more than 2 candidates are Knight and Schiff (2010), Knight and Hummel (2015) and Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016). Knight and Schiff (2010) and Knight and Hummel (2015) develop a model of voter learning about candidate quality in which voters in later states receive some imperfect information about the signal that voters in earlier states observed.…”

Section: Democratic Primarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, our results suggest that much of this signal is directly observed (as in our model) given that share volatility falls throughout the primary season, and not only after the first few election contests. Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016) analyze a structural model of learning about candidate quality in which candidates are also differentiated with respect to their political positions. They estimate their model using the same data as the present paper, but focus on simulating the effects of different institutional setups, such as moving to a simultaneous primary system.…”

Section: Democratic Primarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We discuss models with predictions that are not fully consistent with the observed pattern of results. We then propose an explanation based on the model in Deltas, Herrera, and Polborn (2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries

Deltas

Polborn

2018

Public Choice

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When candidates in primary elections are ideologically differentiated (e.g., conservatives and moderates in the Republican party), then candidates with similar positions affect each others' vote shares more strongly than candidates with different ideological positions. We measure this effect in U.S. Presidential primaries and show that it is of first order importance. We also show that voter beliefs about the candidates harden over the course of the primary, as manifested in the variability of candidate vote shares. We discuss models of sequential voting that cannot yield this pattern of results, and propose an explanation based on a model with horizontally and vertically differentiated candidates and incompletely informed voters. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we also show that, in more conservative states, low quality conservative candidates do better relative to high quality conservatives, and vice versa.

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Section: Democratic Primarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Democratic Primarymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries

Deltas

Polborn

2018

Public Choice

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“…Finally, in closely related work, Deltas et al. () examine a model in which late voters learn about valence from the voting returns in early states. In addition to this vertical dimension, candidates are also distinguished by a horizontal dimension, and, when there are more than two candidates, their model thus introduces the potentially interesting issue of ticket‐splitting.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis

Hummel

Knight

2015

Int Economic Review

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Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front‐runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front‐runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.

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“…Deltas et al (2010) provide a framework for analyzing the trade-o¤ between learning about the candidates' quality (valence) and coordination in primary elections. They simulated various types of sequential elections using estimated structural parameters and showed that sequential elections in which candidates remain in the race yield the highest expected valence.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early

Dekel

Piccione

2014

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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The objective of this paper is to study a model of voting with multiple candidates in which the voters choose the time in which they cast their votes. By voting late a voter can condition his vote on which candidates are still viable. By voting early a voter can reduce the …eld of viable candidates. It turns out that the latter factor can be harmful: while the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate increases, so does the likelihood that they vote for one of the remaining viable opponents, and the latter e¤ect can be dominant.In particular, if voters vote for their favorite candidates as long as the probability of that candidate winning is strictly positive, then early voting has a strategic disadvantage and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Voting in this manner is an equilibrium when one's favorite candidate is signi…cantly better than all the others. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good then any Markov, symmetric and anonymous equilibrium must involve sequential voting (and di¤er from simultaneous voting).

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Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System

Abstract: To analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. presidential primary system, we develop a model in which candidates with different policy positions and qualities compete for the nomination,

Cited by 8 publications

References 24 publications

Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries

Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries

Sequential or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis

The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early

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