2005
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-004-6977-7
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Learning and Exploiting Relative Weaknesses of Opponent Agents

Abstract: Agents in a competitive interaction can greatly benefit from adapting to a particular adversary, rather than using the same general strategy against all opponents. One method of such adaptation is Opponent Modeling, in which a model of an opponent is acquired and utilized as part of the agent's decision procedure in future interactions with this opponent. However, acquiring an accurate model of a complex opponent strategy may be computationally infeasible. In addition, if the learned model is not accurate, the… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…As stated earlier, using a naive Eval maximization strategy to a certain search depth will not always yield satisfactory results for several reasons: (1) the search horizon problem when searching for a fixed depth [52]; (2) the strong assumption of an optimally rational, unbounded resources adversary; (3) using an estimated evaluation function which will not give optimal results in all world states and can be exploited [42].…”
Section: A Ag Believes That Each Of His Adversaries In a Has The I Ntmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…As stated earlier, using a naive Eval maximization strategy to a certain search depth will not always yield satisfactory results for several reasons: (1) the search horizon problem when searching for a fixed depth [52]; (2) the strong assumption of an optimally rational, unbounded resources adversary; (3) using an estimated evaluation function which will not give optimal results in all world states and can be exploited [42].…”
Section: A Ag Believes That Each Of His Adversaries In a Has The I Ntmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, its strict assumptions rarely hold for more complex competitive situations, where it might be too hard to come up with a good heuristic function and the agent's limited resources and computational limitation prevents it from expanding the full search tree (causing the well known horizon problem [52]). Moreover, running the algorithm under the assumptions that the opponent is rational and is using the same heuristic function might limit our outcome (see [42] for situations were those weaknesses were exploited); obviously, the more knowledge we have on our opponent the better we can strategise against him in an adversarial interaction (e.g. [9,11,60,67]).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…One way to overcome this problem is to model only certain aspects of the agents' strategy. Markovitch and Reger (2005) learn the opponent's weaknesses and bias the search towards states where the opponent's strategy is expected to be weak.…”
Section: Bridge Biddingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This learning mechanism can be viewed as a speedup learner where a rough approximation of the other agents' decision procedure is learned and expressed by induced decision nets. Some of the above works include algorithms for learning opponent agent models on the basis of their past behavior (Billings et al, 2003;Davidson et al, 2000;Sen and Arora, 1997;Bruce et al, 2002;Markovitch & Reger, 2005). The learning framework presented here focuses on adapting to co-agents.…”
Section: Bridge Biddingmentioning
confidence: 99%