Learning from Words*

Lackey, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00605.x

Cited by 82 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Other epistemologists deny the epistemic significance of trust (e.g. Lackey 2008). But even sceptics such as Lackey accept that testimony is typically intertwined with interpersonal normative expectations, opening up opportunities for resentment and gratitude, justice and injustice, whether or not these are epistemically significant.…”

Section: Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice

Hawley¹

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

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word count 5976 Introduction There are many overlapping concepts of trust within philosophy. These are multiplied still further when we look to other disciplinessuch as psychology, economics, and sociologyand when we reflect upon our ordinary ways of thinking and talking about trust. Sometimes trust is thought of as an emotionally-thrilling leap into the dark; sometimes it is pictured as a bloodless pragmatic choice, based on cost-benefit analysis. Paradigmatic settings for trust vary from our most intimate personal relationships to our interactions with government, media, or corporate brands. And we talk of trusting what someone says, trusting someone to do something, or simply trusting someone, all to varying degrees. Absence of trust, likewise, is multi-faceted. It inherits all the conceptual variety associated with trust. Moreover, for any given notion of trust, there are at least three different ways in which trust can be absent. First, we may lack trust in a given situation because we think that neither trust nor distrust is merited, that trustworthiness is not at stake. For example, my neighbour is not a philosopher, and has not offered to write this chapter for me. So I do not trust my neighbour to write this chapter for me, but nor do I distrust her in that respect: I recognise that neither of these attitudes fits the situation. Second, we may lack trust through lack of evidence: we think that a situation is one in which either trust or distrust is appropriate, but we can't tell which of these is the right attitude. For example, suppose my neighbour has offered to care for my garden whilst I'm away, but I don't know whether she is trustworthy in such matters. I think that either trust is appropriate here, or else distrust is appropriate, but I don't know which. Third, we may lack trust when we think that trust-or-distrust is appropriate, i.e. that trustworthiness is at stake, and moreover that trust is inappropriate. For example, suppose my neighbour has promised to turn off her music at midnight, but I know from bitter experience that she never keeps such promises. In such a situation my lack of trust amounts to distrust. Thus distrust should be distinguished from mere lack of trust, and from mere agnosticism about trust. The relationship between trust and distrust is in some ways analogous to that between justice and injustice: it is fruitful to examine justice through the lens of injustice, and likewise it is fruitful to examine trust through the lens of distrust (I pursue this project in Hawley (2014a)). On any understanding of trust and distrust, these attitudes are intertwined with issues of social power (Allen (2017)). Trusting, distrusting, being trusted, and being distrusted can all flow from the exercise of social power, and all can have consequences for social power. When you trust someone, you make yourself dependent upon her, giving her a certain power over you: a trusted person enjoys a great deal of discretion in her action. But, as Spiderman reminds us, with great power comes great respon...

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Section: Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice

Hawley¹

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

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“…245–46) offers counter‐examples to the specific definitions proposed by Carson () and Fallis () . Moreover, she gives a case of selfless assertion (see Lackey , pp. 110–14) and suggests that it is a counter‐example to any attempt to define lying without any appeal to deception.…”

Section: Lying Without Deceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many moral philosophers (e.g., Plato [380 BC], Augustine [395], Kant [1785], Bok ) have been concerned with when it is wrong to lie and why it is wrong to lie. Also, epistemologists (e.g., Hume [1748], Lackey ) have considered whether we can acquire knowledge from what other people say if they might be trying to deceive to us. But in order to answer any of these questions, it is important to first have a good understanding of exactly what lying and deception are (see Carson , p. 284) and how they are related.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

Fallis

2014

Ratio

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According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald-faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is 'an unhappy divorce' because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald-faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.

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“…As many philosophers (e.g., Lipton 1998, Lackey 2008 have pointed out, we acquire much of our knowledge from other people rather than from direct observation of the world. But the epistemology of testimony has tended to focus on one individual talking to another or possibly one individual talking to many others, in the case of books or television, for example.…”

Section: Pa P E R S U M M a R I E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: The Epistemology of Mass Collaboration

Fallis¹

2009

Episteme

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Human beings regularly work together to get things done. In particular, people frequently collaborate on the production and dissemination of knowledge. For example, scientists often work together in teams to make new discoveries. How such collaborations produce knowledge, and how well they produce knowledge, are important questions for epistemology. In fact, several epistemologists (e.g., Hardwig 1991, Thagard 1997, Wray 2002) have addressed such questions regarding collaborative scientific research.

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Learning from Words*

Cited by 82 publications

References 52 publications

Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice

Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

Introduction: The Epistemology of Mass Collaboration

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