Learning How to Learn: A Critique

Abstract

The claim that ‘learning how to learn’ is the central ability required for young people to be effective ‘lifelong learners’ is examined for various plausible interpretations. It is vacuous if taken to mean that we need to acquire a capacity to learn, since we necessarily have this if we are to learn anything. The claim that it is a specific ability is then looked at. Once again, if we acquire an ability to learn we do not need the ability to learn how to learn. After noting the implausibility of any such general ability, the paper goes on to examine the claim that certain specific but transferable abilities might satisfy the description ‘learning how to learn’. Various candidates are considered: forming and testing hypotheses and abduction are two promising ones, but each has significant weaknesses. Numeracy and literacy are thought to be more promising, but achievements at the national level leave a lot to be desired, despite the clear advantages for learning of being able to read, write and count. If we needed to learn how to learn before we learned how to read, write and count, it is unlikely that we would get anywhere. Finally, certain non‐cognitive dispositions and character traits rather than cognitive attributes are considered and, drawing on the work of Robert Dearden and others, it is suggested that the development of these aretaic (virtue‐based) and personal qualities rather than cognitive ones may be most decisive for developing independent learning in a range of subject matters.

Aprender a aprender y su implicación pedagógica en España: una aproximación desde la Filosofía de la Educación

“…Por ello, se podría plantear la capacidad como un elemento innato, mientras que la habilidad es adquirida (Chomsky, 1997). En este sentido es necesario cuestionarse: si la capacidad de aprender es innata, por qué necesitamos aprender a aprender, por qué se reclama el desarrollo de esta competencia desde el sistema educativo (Winch, 2008).…”

Learning, Work and Practice: New Understandings

“…His contestation of propositional knowledge has its roots in Aristotle's work and the more recent philosophies of Kant, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Bourdieu and contemporary approaches to learning and knowledge by post-structuralist thinkers such as Derrida ( 2004 ) , Lyotard ( 1984 ) , and Winch ( 2010 ) . His contestation of propositional knowledge has its roots in Aristotle's work and the more recent philosophies of Kant, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Bourdieu and contemporary approaches to learning and knowledge by post-structuralist thinkers such as Derrida ( 2004 ) , Lyotard ( 1984 ) , and Winch ( 2010 ) .…”

“…This requires many virtues besides the Aristotelian virtues of courage (it is a risky thing to acknowledge changing ways of being), prudence and desire and requires, according to Winch ( 2010 ) , self-regarding virtues such as patience, persistence, diligence, attention to detail and tenacity. Yet these judgements on the value to the individual and the group of the usefulness of the knowledge and the action to ensue are matters of practical judgement and lead to a skilled judge being considered as a wise person.…”

The Community of Workers' University: A Pragmatic Institution for the Future?

“…It is essential to resist the often-powerful influences on academic discipline such as from sponsors and managerialism for their own, self-serving stakes and requires many other virtues besides the Aristotelian virtues of courage (it is a risky thing to acknowledge changing ways of being), prudence and desire. It also requires, according to Winch (2008), self-regarding virtues such as patience, persistence, diligence, attention to detail and tenacity. Further, the ability to learn involves areteic and personal characteristics in existing practice as putative abilities in knowledge creation, resting upon knowing and choosing and that they may be only realised fully in the community.…”