2017
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2017.1305489
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Learning in Africa: China’s Overseas Oil Investments in Sudan and South Sudan

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Cited by 18 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…As it turned out, Chinese SOCs have little or no leverage over either side, and there is very little the Chinese state can do about the situation except to engage in bilateral and multilateral efforts aimed at bringing peace to the Sudans, including the deployment of Chinese UN peacekeepers to both countries. This also reflects the point made earlier in this chapter and affirmed by Patey (2014Patey ( , 2017Walker, 2014), relating to the relative autonomy of Chinese SOCs, which are not executing a state-directed agenda, but are clearly driven by a 'corporate agenda to ensure survival and wellbeing by acquiring new oil reserves and production' (Patey, 2014: 82), which translate into profit. With time it is becoming more obvious that Chinese SOCs will have to balance their investment decision-making against the risk factors inherent in African petro-states, not least the political terrain and the interests of competing political elites.…”
Section: The Two Sudans: Soc Success and Losses Wedded To African Agesupporting
confidence: 67%
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“…As it turned out, Chinese SOCs have little or no leverage over either side, and there is very little the Chinese state can do about the situation except to engage in bilateral and multilateral efforts aimed at bringing peace to the Sudans, including the deployment of Chinese UN peacekeepers to both countries. This also reflects the point made earlier in this chapter and affirmed by Patey (2014Patey ( , 2017Walker, 2014), relating to the relative autonomy of Chinese SOCs, which are not executing a state-directed agenda, but are clearly driven by a 'corporate agenda to ensure survival and wellbeing by acquiring new oil reserves and production' (Patey, 2014: 82), which translate into profit. With time it is becoming more obvious that Chinese SOCs will have to balance their investment decision-making against the risk factors inherent in African petro-states, not least the political terrain and the interests of competing political elites.…”
Section: The Two Sudans: Soc Success and Losses Wedded To African Agesupporting
confidence: 67%
“…This process transformed Sudan (before 2011) into the third-largest oil producer in Africa, and one of Africa's top oil suppliers to China. It also afforded Chinese SOCs-in the absence of Western oil multinationals forced out by domestic pressures from human rights groups, Western governments, and insecurity occasioned by civil war (Patey, 2017: 760-1)-the opportunity to develop their capacity and gain valuable experience investing in and building the Sudanese oil industry (Patey, 2014: 111-20).…”
Section: The Two Sudans: Soc Success and Losses Wedded To African Agementioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, as the owner of CSOEs, the Chinese government may invest in African countries for political and strategic motives, not strictly for profit (Cuervo-Cazurra et al, 2014). For example, large FDI projects have been carried out in African countries such as Sudan and Angola, with the world's worst governance records (Corkin, 2011b;Patey, 2017).…”
Section: Host Country Governance and Fdi By Csoesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the 2000s, China's NOCs maintained a minor share of worldwide investments, which too remarkably in Sudan and Republic of Kazakhstan, by means of the collective global productions of 140,000 barrels per day. However in 2013, China's NOCs were maintaining near 2.1 million barrels per day among forty-two major oil producing states in the world and CNPC was the major contributor by almost 924,000 barrels per day, followed by Sinopec Oil Company with 630,000 barrels per day, and CNOOC claimed 441,000 barrels per day (Patey, 2017). Meanwhile, just like in Angola along with other oil producing states, a very large number of technical staff and working labor brought in Sudan to maintain and administer these ventures.…”
Section: China's Economic Engagement In Africamentioning
confidence: 99%