Learning in Sequential Auctions

Jeitschko, Thomas D.

doi:10.2307/1061354

Cited by 40 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…For further information on this topic, see e.g. Jeitschko (1998), who gives a comprehensive survey on the topic and provides new insights into the benefits of being able to learn in sequential auctions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects

Budde

Minner

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects

Budde

Minner

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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“…In Jeitschko (1998), for example, bidders are assumed to be of two types, and the seller is assumed to have two items for sale. In this research, we empirically show that bidders' WTP evolves in different stages of participation in sequential online auctions, a phenomenon that confounds the determination of equilibria in such environments.…”

Section: Sequence Of Auctions Fraction Of Repeat Biddersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, much of the literature is comprised of normative models with limiting assumptions about consumer valuation and bidding behavior (e.g., assumption of bidder symmetry), and focusing on equilibrium prices considering a known number of identical items being auctioned in sequence to a group of bidders (Weber 1983, McAfee andVincent 1993). Of particular importance to our work is the study by Jeitschko (1998). He examines how bidders with independent private values (IPV) learn about valuations of other participants in sequential auctions and investigates the impact of this information transmission and learning on their bidding behavior.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Auction literature shows conflicting price trends in sequential auctions: the "morning effect" (Gandal 1997), where prices increase as sequential auctions progress; the "afternoon effect" (McAfee and Vincent 1993, Beggs andGraddy 1997), where prices decline as the auction sequence progresses; and inconclusive price trends where increasing as well as declining trends are observed (Jeitschko 1998). The information effect that underlies the strategies adopted by bidders in sequential auctions leads bidders to trade-off an increased probability of winning in earlier auctions for more information and increase expected payoffs in later auctions (Jeitschko 1998). Price trends in sequential online auctions are partly a manifestation of changes in the participating bidders' willingness to pay (WTP).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Willingness-to-Pay Formation of Repeat Bidders in Sequential Online Auctions

Góes

Karuga

Tripathi

2010

Information Systems Research

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A growing number of vendors are using a sequence of online auctions to sell large inventories of identical items. Although bidding strategies and bidder behavior in single auctions have been extensively studied, limited research exists on bidding in sequential auctions. We seek to explain how bidders in such an environment learn from the information, and form and update their willingness to pay (WTP). Using a large data set from an online auction retailer, we analyze the evolution of the bidders' WTP as well as the effect of auction design on bidders' WTP in sequential auctions. We see our study in the context of a longitudinal field experiment, in which we were able to track actions of repeat bidders over an extended period of time. Our results show that bidders' WTP in sequential auctions can be explained from their demand characteristics, their participation experience in previous auctions, outcomes in previous auctions, and auction design parameters. We also observe, characterize, and measure what we call a modified demand reduction effect exhibited across different auctions, over time, by multiunit demand bidders. Our findings are important to enable better auction mechanism design, and more sophisticated bidding tools that explore the rich information environment of sequential auctions.

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“…For example, the revelation of the winning bid provides valuable information when there are sequential, repeated auctions for similar items [7]. Rational bidders anticipate the availability of information and bid lower and have higher payoffs.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The privacy cost of the second-chance offer

Joshi

Sun

Vora

2005

Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society

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This paper examines a generalization of a two-stage game common on eBay: an ascending-price auction followed by price discrimination (the second chance offer). High bids in the auction lead to high price offers during price discrimination, and a financial disadvantage in the second stage. The disadvantage depends on (a) the amount of information revealed to the seller in the first stage, and hence the extent of privacy protection provided and (b) whether the bidder is non-strategic (ignores the possibility of price discrimination) or rational. A privacy cost of one mechanism over another is defined and studied.For the non-strategic bidder, the second chance offer provides a zero payoff. Addition of privacy protection (anonymity and bid secrecy) decreases revenue and increases expected payoff, with higher bidders benefiting more. Privacy protection can, however, decrease an individual bidder's payoff by shielding potential buyers from the seller and thus causing an opportunity loss.If the bidder is rational, price discrimination results in a lower revenue than consecutive auctions, and is a bad strategy for the seller. Additionally, rational behavior provides more advantage to the bidder than does anonymity protection.

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Learning in Sequential Auctions

Cited by 40 publications

References 0 publications

Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects

Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects

Understanding Willingness-to-Pay Formation of Repeat Bidders in Sequential Online Auctions

The privacy cost of the second-chance offer

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