“Learning it the Hard Way”: Social safeguards norms in Chinese-led dam projects in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia

Abstract

Chinese dam developers claim to construct at least every second dam worldwide. However, scholarly literature comprehensively investigating the social safeguard norms in these projects is rare. This paper analyses social safeguard norms in Chinese-led dam projects in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, hotspots of Chinese-led dam construction. We find that social safeguard norms adopted have significantly changed in the past 15 years. While Chinese dam developers claimed to adopt standards of the host countries upon the launch of China's Going Out Policy in 2001, with occasional adoption of more demanding Chinese standards, they did not adopt international norms. In recent years, however, they increasingly take into account international norms. We argue that the root cause for this change is social mobilization, with the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011 as a particular game changer. Enhanced social safeguard legislation in host countries and China, stricter rules of Chinese funders and cooperation of Chinese dam developers with international players have also facilitated this change.

Financing for Development and Socio-Ecological Transitions: A Review of Chinese Investments in Kenya

“…In the case of DFIs, the client Country is additionally required to adhere to their stringent safeguard standards, so as to ensure effective management of the social-ecological and sustainable outcomes. As a result, social-ecological risks are greater in investments financed by China (Kirchherr et al, 2017;Kragelund, 2008). Such bilateral loans and financial agreements are largely political in nature and may not be thoroughly subjected to the legal and social-ecological safeguards.…”

Large hydropower and legitimacy: A policy regime analysis, applied to Myanmar

“…We engage with the above research question and profound governance challenge by exploring struggles over the legitimacy of a gigawatt-scale hydropower project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 3 2016b); the role of Chinese energy developers and Sino-Myanmar relations (Lamb and Dao, 2017;Perlez, 2006;Sun, 2012;Yeophantong, 2016a, b), environmental and social safeguard norms (Kirchherr et al, 2016b;Kirchherr et al, 2017), perceptions of environmental risk and elite corruption (Kirchherr et al, 2016a) and the role of expert knowledge in decision making (Zhu et al, 2016). Such analyses illuminate a complex case and its context, while suggesting to us that a holistic analysis of hydropower legitimation challenges is timely.…”

“…Third, origins and impacts of civil society mobilization around Myitsone Dam are critical to understand (Chan, 2017;Kiik, 2016b;Kirchherr et al, 2017). Kachin and Burmese nationalisms were key drivers of mobilization which contributed to Myitsone's (de)legitimation (Kiik, 2016b).…”

Large hydropower and legitimacy: A policy regime analysis, applied to Myanmar

“…Myanmar's 2011 suspension of this contested $US3.6 billion energy project was unprecedented (Zhu et al, 2016). Academic accounts focus on various facets relevant to legitimation, for example: activism (Simpson, 2013(Simpson, , 2014; Kachin and Burmese nationalist politics (Kiik, 2016b); the role of Chinese energy developers and Sino-Myanmar relations (Lamb and Dao, 2017;Perlez, 2006;Sun, 2012;Yeophantong, 2016aYeophantong, , 2016b, environmental and social safeguard norms (Kirchherr et al, 2016b(Kirchherr et al, , 2017, perceptions of environmental risk and elite corruption (Kirchherr et al, 2016a) and the role of expert knowledge in decision making (Zhu et al, 2016). Such analyses illuminate a complex case and its context, while suggesting to us that a holistic analysis of hydropower legitimation challenges is timely.…”