This essay concerns the process of how we develop astrobiological morals by examining some of the compromises within ethical argumentation. I illustrate these compromises by turning to Saturn's moon Titan to provide an ethical theory challenge in terms of protecting Titan life, should life be found there, as well as protecting the habitats of that life and enabling the scientific study of that life. Through analysis I find that an intrinsic value approach to astrobiological ethics may, in this case, provide better absolute protection for Titan life. However, an American Buddhist approach, which arises from alternative, deontological ethical presumptions, in this analysis may provide better protection for the habitats of life as well as stronger arguments for the scientific study of extraterrestrial life. In the end we find that the ethical models that we bring to our work strongly color the ethical outcomes that we realize because of the limited, yet still valuable, nature of all forms of ethical argumentation.