Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

Hurka, Steffen; Kaeding, Michael; Obholzer, Lukas

doi:10.1111/jcms.12270

Cited by 26 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Yet, particularly in budgetary and -significantly for our purposes -codecision reports, "the party identification of an MEP is crucial for his chances to draft reports" (Hurka and Kaeding 2012, 525;Hurka et al 2015Hurka et al , 1238. Thus, for instance, the French Mouvement Démocrate -a member of the ALDE with only 4 MEPs -has obtained the same number of codecision reports as the M5S.…”

Section: Office Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Bressanelli

Candia

2018

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic EFDD Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data -the EUANDI party dataset, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP -this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case-study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explain the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first order' national strategic objectives.

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Section: Office Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Bressanelli

Candia

2018

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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“…Attendance in plenary sessions has, for example, proven a strong predictor (Yoshinaka et al, 2010;Hurka and Kaeding, 2012;Hurka, Kaeding, and Obholzer, 2015).…”

Section: Effort Leads To Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse-selection model I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The Moreover, the greater the variation in the candidates' ability, the greater the prior uncertainty around candidacies. This again, increases the effect of performance, as the selectorate needs more information. I test this implication by identifying categories of MEPs whose ability to influence is particularly uncertain.The following study is based on the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members in 11 member-states of the European Union across three elections. The analysis is based on original data on the list placement of 1134 incumbent MEPs, their political background, as well as their effort and performance in office. Results show that

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“…The notable exception is a recent article by Hurka et al. (), which examines the extent to which MEPs from the countries that joined the EU in and after 2004 are under‐represented as shadows.…”

Section: Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteursmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Hurka et al. (), Kaeding () and Yoshinaka et al. () include dummy variables to control for membership in a particular party group, but they do not elaborate on the theoretical rationale for their inclusion or discuss the interpretation of estimated effects of these variables in much detail.…”

Section: The Relational Power Of Small Numbersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rapporteur‐shadow rapporteur networks in the European Parliament: The strength of small numbers

Häge

Ringe

2018

European J Political Res

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Specialisation and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than the exception in legislatures around the world. Yet, little research has studied the sub‐groups of lawmakers who serve as policy leaders on particular bills. This article uses conceptual and methodological tools from social network analysis to investigate the groups’ composition and relational structure. It tests the proposition that limited human resources lead lawmakers from small parties to more frequently engage with a greater number of colleagues from other parties across a wider range of policy areas. This may have important relational benefits that have the potential to outweigh the structural disadvantages of small party size. The article examines whether small party lawmakers participate more, are more central and have greater potential for brokerage in policy‐making networks, or if the constraints associated with small party size and/or particular ideological leanings prevent their realisation. Empirically, the analyses focus on working relationships between rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the adoption of reports by standing committees of the 7th European Parliament, 2009–2014. Methodologically, a mixed methods approach is employed. The quantitative analyses show that small party size does not affect legislators’ participation in policy‐making networks, but that it increases legislators’ centrality and brokerage potential. Regarding ideology, being committed to democratic participation as a good in itself has a positive association with all three outcomes, while attitudes to European integration show no effect. The qualitative data suggest that the relational benefits of belonging to a small party partially mitigate the structural disadvantages associated with it. They also indicate that policy making in the European Parliament is quite inclusive, as any systematic exclusion tends to be the result of self‐marginalisation.

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Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

Cited by 26 publications

References 39 publications

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Love, convenience, or respectability? Understanding the alliances of the Five Star Movement in the European Parliament

Striving for influence

Rapporteur‐shadow rapporteur networks in the European Parliament: The strength of small numbers

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