Learning under supervision: an experimental study

Iyengar, Raghuram; Schotter, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9164-2

Cited by 19 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Although surprising at first, this finding coincides with the results by Iyengar and Schotter (2008). According to them, the need for advisors to produce recommendations and the availability of recommendations for clients facilitates learning for both advisors and clients, compared to decision makers facing the same decision task without advice.…”

supporting

confidence: 84%

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On the evolution of professional consulting

Gehrig¹,

Güth²,

Levı́nský³

et al. 2010

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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International audienceIn this experiment agents repeatedly invest in three state-specific assets. Theory requires portfolios to match the probabilities of the states. The treatments endow none, one, three, or all (of eight) investors with probability information. Will professional consulting evolve as an entrepreneurial activity? Will decisions follow theory or the 1/n-heuristic of equal investments in all assets? Will agents with probability information be asked and paid for advice? Portfolios designed with probability information reect the benchmark but do not converge to it over time. Learning to avoid the 1/n-heuristic is extremely fast. Although advice is sought and readily paid for, recommendations are not always followed

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supporting

confidence: 84%

“…14 One of the findings of Iyengar and Schotter (2008) is that advisors whose advice cannot be neglected learn faster than advisors whose advice can be ignored.…”

Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

On the evolution of professional consulting

Gehrig¹,

Güth²,

Levı́nský³

et al. 2010

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore some adaptation is taking place, as some responders in NO-COM become more accepting between the first and the last periods (p IND = .077, Wilcoxon signed ranks test) while some responders in UNR-COM become more demanding (p SES = .042, p IND = .016). Since responders in NO-COM receive no feedback and do not engage in communication throughout the experiment, this adaptation can not be attributed to learning due to new information, but is more likely to be due to reflection (Iyengar and Schotter, 2008;Weber, 2003). The stronger pattern apparent in UNR-COM, however, suggests that there might be a cumulative effect of communication, for example, if one proposer has an effect on her responder partners that last for future periods (although it's easier to imagine that this has the opposite effect i.e., an effect of an aggressive bargainer rather than of a generous bargainer).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game

Zultan

2012

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…The game was presented to the participants as a game of simultaneous decision making in which the number of possible actions was fixed at four. As we discussed previously, a game with more than two strategies is useful when the researcher wants to add complexity beyond the typical 2 × 2 decision task used to analyze the repeated prisoner's dilemma (Iyengar and Schotter 2008;Merlo andSchotter 1999, 2003).…”

Section: Game Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Curse of Competitiveness: How Advice from Experienced Colleagues and Training Can Hurt Marketing Profitability

Kalra

Soberman

2008

Journal of Marketing

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The literature suggests that mangers are overly competitive and overemphasize competitors' payoffs in making decisions. The authors demonstrate how two seemingly innocuous but common decision inputs that mid-and entrylevel managers use-(1) advice from colleagues and (2) training-could propagate this bias. The authors conduct an experiment in which one generation of participants plays a noncooperative game and then passes on advice on how to play the same game to the second generation. The authors find that the second generation is more likely to accept decisions that negatively impact the competitor's profits, even when those decisions result in lower payoffs. The results suggest that the advice of the first generation causes the second generation to be more sensitive to relative performance. In a second experiment, the authors show that training films that create negative feelings toward competitors can have adverse effects on managers' decisions. The training increases the willingness of managers to sacrifice own profits to reduce competitor profitability. These findings have important implications for managers in competitive markets. This research suggests that standard training materials that emphasize beating competitors should be carefully assessed for their unintentional but potentially damaging effects. In particular, training designed to evoke affective responses toward competitors must be used judiciously. Firms that give junior managers more autonomy and responsibility should also be cognizant that the advice these managers get and the information they share may propagate a competitive bias. To mitigate this problem, an option is to devote resources to better understand the content and nature of advice that managers share with one another.

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Learning under supervision: an experimental study

Abstract: Group decision making, Advice, Learning, Supervision, C91, C92,

Cited by 19 publications

References 32 publications

On the evolution of professional consulting

On the evolution of professional consulting

Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game

The Curse of Competitiveness: How Advice from Experienced Colleagues and Training Can Hurt Marketing Profitability

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