“…Second, our paper contributes to the corporate leasing literature by identifying CEOs’ risk‐taking incentives as an important determinant of the corporate lease‐versus‐buy decision. Studies in this area have identified numerous determinants of leasing, including taxes (Franks & Hodges, 1978; Graham et al, 1998; Miller & Upton, 1976; Myers, Dill, & Bautista, 1976; Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 1996; Smith & Wakeman, 1985), ownership structure (Flath, 1980; Mehran, Taggart, & Yermack, 1999; Smith & Wakeman, 1985), investment opportunity (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Smith & Wakeman, 1985; Stulz & Johnson, 1985; Williamson, 1988), transaction costs (Flath, 1980; Sharpe & Nguyen, 1995; Smith & Wakeman, 1985), leverage (Ang & Peterson, 1984; Bayless & Diltz, 1986; Bowman, 1980; Cosci & Guida, 2015; Krishnan & Moyer, 1994; Mukherjee, 1991), and agency cost and corporate governance factors (Devos & Rahman, 2014; Robicheaux, Fu, & Ligon, 2008). However, the risk‐inducing role of compensation contracts has not been examined.…”