Leaving Lenin: Elites, official ideology and monuments in the Kyrgyz Republic

Abstract

Many Lenin monuments remain in cities around the former Soviet republics and a few national or regional authorities have decreed it against the law to deface or remove them. The Lenin monument in Bishkek, capital city of the Kyrgyz Republic, is an example of both policies. On two main counts, however, the fate of this particular bronze statue of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin has been unusual. Only in the Kyrgyz case was the country's central Lenin monument left untouched for over a decade after the collapse of communism, a decree for its preservation as a national treasure being put in force as late as 2000. And, when, in 2003, the government after all decided to remove the monument, it was then relocated only some 100 yards from its original location. These twin issues of timing and new spatial framing offer a window on the relationship between state ideology and politics in the Kyrgyz Republic. I propose to use an official ideology approach to understand the Kyrgyz ruling elite's ideological relationship to the Lenin monument after the collapse of communism.

The Post-Soviet City as a Communal Apartment: Spatialized Belonging in Ulan-Ude

“…In some post-socialist cities, the urban transformation has been dialectical and blunt in the confrontation of Soviet, socialist, and/or Russian vestiges: they were removed to mark a clear break from the old period and make space for new, ideologically more appropriate monuments and architecture (Williams 2008; Ter-Ghazaryan 2013). In others, the post-socialist urban renewal has been more controversial with a wide range of opinions and emotive reactions, including nostalgia for socialist heritage and resistance to its removal (Ochman 2010; Cummings 2013). On this scale, post-Soviet urban developments in Russia appear on the latter end of the spectrum: while some Soviet monuments have been removed and streets have been renamed, others remained untouched, with locals expressing mixed feelings in many cases (Forest and Johnson 2002; Gill 2005).…”

Democratic and Autocratic Nation Building

“…Nation building from above also comes in the form of symbolic construction and action, including monuments (Cummings 2013;Forest and Johnson 2011), state museums (Mitchell 2016), and public holidays (Mpofu 2016;Petrone 2000). Through these avenues, elites articulate who are the nation's important figures and events, provide guidance on how people should remember them, and link their example to how people should act and feel about their nation in the present.…”

A tale of two presidents: personality cult and symbolic nation-building in Turkmenistan

“…Others, in contrast, have focused on the role of elites and political parties in generating synergies impacting nation-building projects. Some have explored the correlation between power and national construction (Akbarzadeh 1999;Cummings 2002; Isaacs 2011, 2015; Peyrouse 2012b; 6 Beachain, Sheridan, and Stan 2012; Isaacs and With more 2013), the way this power is used and reinforced by symbols (Cummings 2002(Cummings ,2009(Cummings ,2013Denison 2009;6 Beachain 2011;Matveeva 2009), and, more recently, the role of neo-patrimonialism in a number of interesting cases in Central Asia (Kunysz 2012;Laruelle 2012a;Isaacs 2014). Another recent tendency has been to explore the competition between formal, informal, and even insurgent actors (Kevlihan 2007(Kevlihan , 2013a(Kevlihan , 2013bPolese and Kevlihan 2015) that have affected the way political structures and policies in the region have taken shape (Isaacs 2010;Dagiev 2014).…”