Legacies of Violence

Bara, Corinne

doi:10.1177/0022002717711501

Cited by 44 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 66 publications

(130 reference statements)

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“…To test our hypotheses, we merge measures of home country civil society participation, nonviolent protest events, and peacekeeping operations in a dataset containing all post-civil war years from 1990 to 2011 in countries that experienced civil war termination in the post-Cold War era, as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019;Gleditsch et al 2002). Following Bara (2018), we code a conflict as terminated if there are at least two years of inactivity between conflict episodes in the same country. When a new conflict episode starts, the post-civil war phase ceases.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

Belgioioso

Salvatore

Pinckney

2020

International Studies Quarterly

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Do peacekeeping missions facilitate nonviolent political contention in post–civil war countries? The nonviolent expression of political grievances is a crucial part of the post–civil war peace-building process but is understudied thus far. We claim that the presence of peacekeepers significantly contributes to establishing a secure environment for nonviolent political contention, particularly nonviolent public protest. In addition, we claim that peacekeeping missions with personnel from countries with robust civil societies are more likely to promote nonviolent political contention because of prior socialization to civic engagement and bottom-top political participation. This is particularly true for UN police personnel (UNPOL), who both train local police forces and have the most direct interaction with protesters. We test our hypotheses using a newly crafted dataset on nonviolent protests in post–civil war countries and peacekeeping missions’ presence, size, and home-country composition. We find that peacekeeping missions’ presence significantly increases nonviolent protests in post–civil war country-years. This effect is largely explained by the presence of UNPOL from countries with strong civil societies. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of post–civil war political revitalization and policy implications for the composition of peacekeeping missions.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

Belgioioso

Salvatore

Pinckney

2020

International Studies Quarterly

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“…This threat became more imminent with the security vacuum created by the uprising in 2011-2012 as it was feared that the conflict would spread across the border and destabilise Saudi Arabia or lead to an uptick in terrorist attacks. 33 Previously, Saudi Arabia had been able to extend some control over Yemeni politics through its extensive patronage network. However, by 2011 the network had been weakened which was further accelerated by the political vacuum following the uprising and subsequent transitional process.…”

Section: Explanations For Saudi-led Military Intervention Into Yemen ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegation or intervention

Clausen

2022

Saudi Arabia and Iran

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The Saudi-led military intervention into Yemen called 'Operation Decisive Storm' was announced on 26 March 2015 (renamed to 'Operation Restoring Hope' in April 2015). It came after a tumultuous period in Yemen following widespread protest in 2011/2012 that succeeded in forcing the long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh to hand over the presidency to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The subsequent transition process was initially accentuated by the United Nations (UN) as a positive example of a negotiated transfer and an inclusive political process, but gradually it became clear that it had failed to achieve buy-in from key elite actors. In September 2014, an armed group, commonly referred to as the Houthi movement, took control over the capital, Sana'a, and after a brief intermezzo where the UN sought to (re)commit the warring parties to political negotiations, the political process collapsed. The situation quickly escalated as Hadi and his government were placed under house arrest. In mid-February 2015, Hadi escaped from house arrest and travelled to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen, which he announced as his interim capital. However, within a month Aden was under attack from the Houthis and Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. At this point, Hadi requested the UN and the Arab League for support by all available means including military intervention with reference to the UN Charter Article 51 and the right to selfdefence, as well as the Charter of the Arab League and the Treaty on Joint Defence, in March 2015 just before the commencement of the Saudi-led military intervention. 1 In the announcement of the Saudi-led military intervention by the Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir, the objective of the intervention was 'to defend the legitimate government of President Hadi from the takeover attempts by the Houthi militia in Yemen'. 2 Although Saudi Arabia has a long history of interfering in Yemeni politics, the 2015 military intervention stands out for its intensity. Hence, researchers and analysts have discussed the reasons for this shift in Saudi foreign policy, pointing to a combination of internal Saudi politics and structural shifts following the Arab Uprisings

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“…Although still developing as of the writing of this paper, the COVID-19 pandemic has implications for multilateral efforts to prevent violent conflict in fragile contexts. Despite the UN Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire on 23 March 2020 in response to the pandemic, and UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2532 that subsequently affirmed his proposition, violent conflict in conflict-affected situations such as Yemen, Libya and Myanmar has continued unabated (Political Settlements Research Programme, 2020 [33]; Asia Foundation, 2020 [34]). Moyer and Kaplan (2020 [35]), assessing increased risks of violent conflict due to the socio-economic and political consequences of COVID-19, suggest that 13 additional contexts are likely to experience conflict by 2022, a 56% increase over pre-pandemic forecasts.…”

Section: Box 11 Conflict Prevention and Coronavirus (Covid-19)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict prevention in fragile contexts

Desai¹

2020

OECD Development Co-Operation Working Papers

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This document, as well as any data and any map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Please cite this paper as Desai, H. "Conflict prevention in fragile contexts" OECD Development Cooperation Working Papers, No 78 OECD Publishing, Paris.

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Legacies of Violence

Cited by 44 publications

References 66 publications

Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

Delegation or intervention

Conflict prevention in fragile contexts

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