Driver's licenses and traffic lights make driving safer. And dollar bills and credit cards make exchanges more efficient as compared to bartering. Social objects can be useful in such ways because they have certain powers. Dollar bills have purchasing power. And driver's licenses restrict access to the public road to people that have them. But what purpose do social objects serve more generally? To answer this question, I explore the role they play in social practices and institutions. Such social forms are patterns of behavior. Their function is to generate collective benefits. Social objects and the powers they have typically play an important role in this process. According to the dual function theory that I propose here, social objects have two functions, a contributory function and a signaling function. Their contributory function is to facilitate or enable social forms to generate collective benefits. In order for them to contribute to this process, agents must exercise their social powers. But how do objects acquire such powers? Due to certain salient characteristics. Such signals enable agents to converge on the same kind of object for similar purposes. Thus, the signaling function of social objects is to indicate mutually beneficial opportunities for interaction that involve those powers. In this sense, traffic lights signal when to stop and when to go. After presenting this dual function theory, I use it to solve a puzzle that Seumas Miller (2001) and Barry Smith (2003) introduced almost two decades ago. Intuitively, the status of an object and its powers go together. For instance, in order for a piece of paper to be a dollar bill, it must be possible to use it as a means of exchange. However, a dollar bill can be so damaged that no one accepts it anymore. It appears that such "failing originals" have a status but not its concomitant powers (Almäng 2016). The reverse seems possible as well. A counterfeit dollar bill can look so real that one can use it to buy things with. This has been taken to mean that what I call "passing forgeries" have certain powers but not the associated status. Cases such as these give rise to what I call "the mismatch problem," which is the challenge of saving the intuition that statuses and powers stand or fall together. 1 Barry Smith (2003) and Jan Almäng (2016) have argued that the intuition cannot be saved. Against this, I argue that their examples present only apparent mismatches. Thus, the intuition that statuses come with powers can be preserved. In Section 1, I present the dual function theory of social objects. I use it to solve