‘Legalization’ in international relations: A conceptual analysis

Abstract

In 2000, International Organization published a special issue on the theme of 'legalization in world politics' which laid the foundation for a very influential research programme on international cooperation and the role of institutions in international affairs. The most enduring legacy of the special issue is the operationalization of the concept of 'legalization' itself, which is defined as a combination of three dimensions: obligation, precision and delegation. After deconstructing the initial concept, this research presents a systematic evaluation of the concept of legalization, taking stock of a decade-long history of empirical use. It then proposes a new concept structure by questioning the levels of substitutability and independence originally assigned to each of the three initial dimensions. RésuméEn 2000, la revue International Organization publiait un numéro entièrement consacré au phénomène de la 'juridicisation' des échanges internationaux (international legalization en anglais). Un collectif d'auteurs reconnus y proposait une opérationnalisation du concept de juridicisation, définie comme une combinaison de trois dimensions institutionnelles: l'obligation, la précision et la délégation. Cette innovation conceptuelle eut un impact considérable sur la production académique en Relations internationales. Après avoir dégagé la structure théorique du concept initial, le présent article passe en revue les applications empiriques qui en ont fait usage au cours de la

Can the Rational Design of International Institutions Solve Cooperation Problems? Insights from a Systematic Literature Review

“…This use of international legalization is identified as increased centralization or the integration of delegated dispute settlement resolution procedures. Bélanger and Fontaine-Skronski's [52] (p. 258) empirical research on the concept of legalization supports this identification. Their work identifies three dimensions that constitute legalization: obligation, precision, and delegation.…”

“…Early rationalist approaches analyzed compliance problems arising from cooperation [46][47][48]. They focused on changes in the conception of sovereignty [49] on the asymmetric benefits of principal-agent models [48,50] also on aspects of formalization and legalization of rules [3,51,52]. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal [2] focus on the analysis of collective action problems and incomplete information.…”