Legislative Bargaining with Teams

Bradfield, Anthony J.; Kagel, John H.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2410641

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Under all less-than-unanimity rules, by contrast, expected payoffs are either decreasing or non-monotone in disagreement values, and the player with the largest disagreement value never achieves the greatest payoff. 8 The following subsection establishes that all equilibria without delay satisfy these properties. Equilibria with delay are discussed in Appendix A.6.…”

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 89%

“…These (symmetric stationary subgame perfect) equilibrium properties of the BF model have been experimentally investigated in a number of papers (McKelvey, 1991, Fréchette et al, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, Diermeier and Morton 2005, Agranov and Tergiman, 2014a, and Bradfield and Kagel, 2015). All of these studies investigated the simple majority rule version of the game.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clearly, z i is increasing in r i for players in the set H. The values Z L and z q can be found from the system of two linear equations and two unknowns (4) and (8). Once these two values have been found, z i values for players in L can be found from (7) and z i values for players in H can be found from (9).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous 'disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-thanunanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding support for these predictions. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Communication in legislative bargaining

Barański

Kagel

2015

J Econ Sci Assoc

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.

show abstract

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

Moya

Vanberg

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

show abstract

Legislative Bargaining with Teams

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

Communication in legislative bargaining

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About