Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Senate

Volden, Craig; Wiseman, Alan E.

doi:10.1086/697121

Cited by 49 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…We rely on two outcome variables to assess changes in legislative productivity. First, we use the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) , which measures the “ability to advance a member’s agenda items through the legislative process and into law” for members of Congress (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 2018). This dataset includes the number of bills that each representative sponsored as well as their LES in each Congress.…”

Section: Data and Stylized Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we examine members’ lawmaking activities. To do so, we use Legislative Effectiveness Scores (LES), which measure members’ success in moving significant and substantive legislation through Congress (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 2018). We also examine the types of bills that legislators sponsor in Congress using the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

Shepherd

You

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers’ final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member’s bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.

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Section: Data and Stylized Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

Shepherd

You

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…Following previous research in this domain, we used the first dimension score and ignored the second. We also collected data on the individual characteristics of politicians from Volden and Wiseman ().…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Politicians Tweet? Extremists, Underdogs, and Opposing Parties as Political Tweeters

Hong¹,

Choi²

2019

Policy & Internet

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Why do some politicians actively use social media, while others lag behind? To answer this question, we propose that opposing party politicians, underdogs, and extremists are more likely to become active political tweeters. Research has shown that media attention is generally concentrated on politicians with power; that is, ruling parties and party leaders. We thus hypothesize that politicians marginalized from media attention, namely backbenchers and those from opposing parties, may perceive greater potential benefits from social media. Further, politicians whose ideological positions do not match well with those of major news media (i.e., extremists) may perceive risks in facing tough questions from journalists, as well as the media's gatekeeping process. We thus hypothesize that extremists may perceive greater benefits from using social media, because they can control their message. We tested these hypotheses using data on U.S. Senators’ public communication activities on Twitter and in press releases in 2009–2011 and found strong support.

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“…For example, Rocca and Sanchez (2008) demonstrated that the most senior legislators sponsored more bills than the least senior legislators. Volden and Wiseman (2018) found that senior legislators scored higher on legislative effectiveness.…”

Section: Explanatory Variables For Legislators’ Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Length of time as a legislator is a dominant explanation for legislative effectiveness (Jeydel and Taylor, 2003; Volden and Wiseman, 2018). Senior legislators tend to be more active and more successful in their legislative activities than junior legislators.…”

Section: Explanatory Variables For Legislators’ Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A new approach to measuring legislators’ activity

Akirav

2019

International Political Science Review

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How do we measure the activity of legislators? I argue that, in addition to using measures such as how many bills they pass, we must also consider activities such as parliamentary questions, early day motions, motions for the agenda and one-minute speeches. One means for doing so is Akirav’s activity scale developed in Israel. I use this scale to measure legislators’ activity in two additional political systems – the United States and the United Kingdom. I also identify the characteristics shared by the most active legislators and the least active. The findings indicate that opposition, junior and committee chair legislators are more active than other representatives. While previous studies have investigated the cost–benefit analysis in which legislators engage regarding where and how to invest their time in their legislative work, this study is the first to conduct such an analysis about both their legislative and non-legislative activities. This more complete picture reveals their incentives for engaging fully in parliamentary work.

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Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Senate

Cited by 49 publications

References 24 publications

Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress

Why Do Politicians Tweet? Extremists, Underdogs, and Opposing Parties as Political Tweeters

A new approach to measuring legislators’ activity

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