Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament

Abstract

This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European Parliament. Drawing from conceptualizations of legitimacy, and theoretical work on information-access we argue that different procedures bestow a different type of authority to parliamentary committees affecting their legitimacy orientation, in turn impacting the balance between private and public interests mobilized. We assess a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and the procedural output across the 7 th legislature's committees (2009-2014). Our analysis indicates that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see greater private interest mobilization. Conversely, in committees where the procedures' ratios are inverse we observe greater public interest mobilization. Theoretically, we provide a novel approach for framing the committee's nature from a procedural perspective, bridging discussions on interest group mobilization and the democratic deficit. Empirically, the results overturn the premise of business dominance across the institution's committees through a unique dataset.

Governance, accountability, and political legitimacy: who participates in the European parliament’s committee hearings (ECON 2004–2014)

“…We begin by assessing changes in participants from the interest group population. In agreement with research noting their intense mobilization across the EP's committees (Coen & Katsaitis 2019b), interest groups are the primary organizations represented in hearings, accounting for slightly more than half of the overall speaker population across legislatures (see Figures 1, 2 and Table 1 in annex). Institutional actors and agencies cover the remaining population of participants.…”

Deliberative layering: Explaining diverse interest mobilization across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle

“…The EP faces a diverse population of groups providing information (inputs) to policy‐makers that demand it, in exchange for inside information, influence over the final output, and insider status (Coen & Katsaitis, 2015, 2019a). Assuming that the EP wishes to maintain its democratic legitimacy, MEPs can be expected to demand information from interest groups to engage in debates that produce legitimate legislative outputs, a form of deliberation where policy‐makers receive and process information to make policy‐choices.…”

“…To protect its democratic credentials against accusations of business bias, the European Parliament encourages the mobilization of a diverse interest population to inform its policy‐making. As a result, over the past 15 years, the lobbyists working with the institution have shifted from primarily corporate to more general societal interests (Coen & Katsaitis, 2019a; Lehmann, 2009). In this paper, we aim to explain when and why different interest groups mobilize across the EP's policy cycle.…”

Lobbying Brexit Negotiations: Who Lobbies Michel Barnier?

“…Interest groups come in different shapes and sizes. Even under the strictest definition, which in the EU context would be an accredited lobbyist (see Coen & Katsaitis, 2019b, for a discussion), the groups mobilized in Brussels number in the thousands. To become a legitimate representative across a plethora of interests that hold different positions across issues, operating across levels and national boundaries is a daunting task.…”