Legislative professionalism and group concentration: The ESA model revisited

Abstract

What drives interest group concentration? Presently, the Energy-StabilityArea (ESA) model provides the basis for explaining the proliferation and diversity of interest organizations both within states and the federal government as a whole. However, while past research argues that institutions have an important effect in generating group mobilization, applications of legislative professionalism to the ESA model are unclear at best, showing either conflicting conclusions regarding the nature of its indirect influence or showing no influence at all. Utilizing an original data set, this study reexamines the relationship between legislative professionalism and group density using the ESA model as a framework. The results show that professionalized legislatures, through their ability to accommodate a diverse set of policy positions, encourage group formation and serve as an additional source of energy within the ESA model. This provides support to the notion that highly professionalized state legislatures employ more outside organizations when formulating policy.

America's Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States

“…Such staff can substitute for lobbyists, thereby discouraging lobbying. Kattelman (2015) approached the relationship differently by expecting such staff to serve as additional access points for lobbyists, thereby increasing lobbying activity. Legislators in more professionalized assemblies would more effectively “capitalize on the information supply that groups provide” (p. 171).…”

A Squire Index Update

“…Lawmakers invest their leaders with less power as professionalization increases and assign their leaders’ preferences less weight in voting decisions (Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge 2016; Richman 2010). Lawmakers in more professionalized legislatures make greater use of outside groups in developing policy (Kattelman 2015). Bureaucrats are more effectively constrained and have less influence on legislative outcomes in more professionalized legislatures and government programs are more likely to be terminated (Boehmke and Shipan 2015; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001; McGrath 2013; Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 2012; Thom and An 2017).…”

State Higher Education Interest Group Densities: An Application of the Energy-Stability-Area Model to Higher Education

“…Additional political considerations that do not fall easily within the ESA framework have also been tested. Among these include state political ideology and legislative professionalism (Berkman, 2001;Boehmke, 2002Boehmke, , 2008Gray et al, 2015;Kattelman, 2015) and whether lobbying regulations impact interest group ecologies (Flavin, 2015;Newmark, 2005;Ozymy, 2010;Strickland, 2014).…”