Legislative Representation

Rieselbach, Leroy N.

doi:10.4324/9780429495359-16

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

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“…A number of studies (Aberbach et al 1981; Wilson 1989; Eisner 1993; Rieselbach 1995; Carpenter 2000, 2001; Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 2012; Workman 2015) have argued that bureaucrats’ influence on the policy process is not limited to administrative rulemaking and policy implementation, the stages of the process under their formal purview. These studies contend that bureaucrats exercise influence at the policy-formulation stage, including the legislative process.…”

Section: Bureaucrats Interest Groups and Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bureaucrats’ preferred outcomes may take a number of legislative forms: they may want to kill nonpreferred bills, increase the chances of passage for preferred bills, or change legislative language. Their goals in doing so may include maintaining their discretion (Lowi 1979; Peters 1981; Krause 2003), maximising their budgets (Niskanen 1971) or furthering specific policy goals (Rieselbach 1995; Krause 2003, 2010). Likewise, lobbying also benefits interest groups by increasing the likelihood of groups’ desired policy outcomes.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Who lobbies the lobbyists? State Medicaid bureaucrats’ engagement in the legislative process

Bradley¹,

Haselswerdt²

2016

J. Pub. Pol.

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Research on bureaucratic power typically focusses on rulemaking and policy implementation, while bureaucrats’ participation in the legislative process remains underexplored. We theorise and test a specific mechanism by which bureaucrats attempt to sway legislative outcomes, which we term indirect bureaucratic lobbying. Using a novel survey of state-based health lobbyists in 25 states, we show that state Medicaid agency staff routinely request lobbying assistance from provider associations and consumer advocates. We also provide the first systematic evidence of the conditions under which indirect bureaucratic lobbying is likely to occur. Our results suggest that individual-level policy agreement interacts with institutional factors, most notably agency performance and gubernatorial power, to increase the likelihood that bureaucrats will use this strategy to attempt to influence legislative deliberations.

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