Legislative sanctions and the strategic environment of judicial review

“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court

“…Whereas a Supreme Court that flies in the face of powerful supermajorities may well find its wings clipped, a Court that acts in implicit concert with sympathetic party or factional leaders may be protected from legislative sanction by the very veto points that make judicial review useful to a political coalition in the first place (Whittington 2003). Indeed, such a Court provides incentives to elected officials to seek to build the kind of diffuse support for the Court in the general public that public opinion scholars have emphasized as important to judicial legitimacy.…”

“…3 James Rogers (2001) has likewise suggested an informational theory of judicial review by which legislators might rely on sympathetic courts to exercise the power of judicial review to correct inadvertent constitutional errors. It is unclear how politically important such a judicial function might be in practice (Whittington 2003), but it could work in complement with the friendly judicial review laid out here.…”

Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution: An Update of Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court from 1955–1984

“…If the legislature uses attacks to send signals about their preferences (Rogers 2001;Whittington 2003), then it is problematic to include some signals while excluding others. As Clark (2012) himself points out in his review of Engel's book, "Even purely rhetorical attacks on the Court may have consequences."…”

“…Within the amendatory attacks, our sweep revealed 1,497 newly discovered court curbing measures not previously listed in Clark's database. By viewing court curbing attempts as elite signals (Rogers 2001;Whittington 2003;Clark 2012) and including every instance of the behavior, we more than triple the number of known attacks.…”

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System der BRD – ein unbekanntes Wesen?

“…hierzu zählen Unterbindung der Wiederwahl (Schwartz 1999), drohung mit einem Amtsenthebungsverfahren gegen einzelne Richter sowie die Suspension des gesamten Gerichtes (Epstein et al 2001b), der Entzug von einzelnen bereichen der Rechtsprechung (Epstein et al 2001a;Ferejohn u. Weingast 1992;hausegger u. baum 1999;Meernik u. Ignagni 1997;Shipan 2000;Whittington 2001Whittington , 2006 oder die umgehung von urteilen (Vanberg 2001(Vanberg , 2005a. diese beschränkungsmöglichkeiten haben auf die Verfassungsrichter zwei unterschiedliche, aber miteinander verbundene Wirkungen.…”