Legitimacy and Punitiveness: The Role of Judicial Actors in Italian Penality

Gallo, Zelia

doi:10.1108/s1521-613620140000019001

Cited by 1 publication

(4 citation statements)

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“…This analysis leads me to argue that the alternation between punitiveness and moderation visible in Italian prison rates is in fact a broader feature of Italian penality. The latter should be understood as oscillating between repression and leniency – with the two co-existing, rather than being mutually exclusive (Nelken, 2005: 219–221; see also Gallo, 2014: 5–7). This ‘dualism’, or tension, between repression and leniency can be seen as a historical feature visible across penal reform and legislation (Padovani, 1981: 93).…”

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Emergencies have, however, also been tackled via ‘special’ laws. The latter have created a potential for punitiveness, in relation to their direct targets but also because of their broader impact: a ‘ halo effect ’ with formal repression spreading outwards, as emergency provisions persisted beyond the emergency for which they were introduced (La Greca, 2005: 48; Pavarini, 1994: 59, 1997: 84–85; Ruggiero, 1998: 216; see also Gallo, 2014: 14).…”

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…‘Instrumental’, in this analysis, seems to be the judiciary’s use of emergency legislation, as judges and prosecutors pursued their mandate to repress terrorism and organised crime. Instrumental is also the political class, whose reforms in matters of emergencies delegated the latter’s resolution to the judiciary (Della Porta, 2001: 14; Ferrajoli, 1996: 71; Gallo, 2014): increasing judicial discretion via insufficiently precise legislative provisions (Padovani, 1981: 93), and ultimately relying on the criminal law rather than attempting to address the root causes of Italy’s emergencies. This argument seems to imply an excess (and unprincipled) use of the criminal law and penal sanctions, where the latter were used as a stop-gap solution to structural problems, causing a consequent increase in overall levels of punishment.…”

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preventive custody has been used against Italy’s emergencies (Bricola, 1981: 12; De Vito, 2009: 95) employed, Luigi Stortoni explains, as a bargaining tool with which to obtain cooperation from ‘repentant’ terrorist and organised criminals. Stortoni further claims that the use of preventive custody later transformed into a more generalised praxis (in Rinaldi, 1992: 96, n. 33; see also Gallo, 2014: 14): though ‘softened’ in the early 1990s, the legal institution has persisted beyond the terrorism and organised crime emergencies (Della Porta, 2001: 14). Preventive custody has inflated prison rates to the present day, so much so that a 2013 European Court of Human Rights judgment specifically identified it as an area in need of reform and a cause of over-crowding ( Torreggiani and others v. Italy , 2013).…”

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Punishment, authority and political economy: Italian challenges to western punitiveness

Gallo

2015

Punishment & Society

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This article explores the challenges that Italy poses for existing analyses of western punishment. These ‘challenges’ are visible at the penal level and in relation to the variables used to explain contemporary penal trends. In this article I argue that Italian penality cannot be understood in terms of unequivocal ‘punitiveness’ or unequivocal ‘moderation’. Italian trends betray a co-existence and alternation of repression and leniency, whose incidence I trace in penal reform and legislation. I explore the issue of waning state sovereignty and its presumed contribution to increasing punitiveness, explaining why the evolution of the Italian state does not fit this narrative. I argue that Italy is a contested state, whose penal law can be sidelined by the informal norms with which it co-exists. I also ask whether Italian penality can be explained by reference to political economy. I argue that Italy’s hybrid political economy challenges the methodological approach that predicts punitiveness or moderation by reference to political economic evolution. I conclude by explaining why politics – political dynamics, institutions and culture – is the key organizing principle with which to systematize contemporary Italian penality. I argue that political dynamics should likewise be reconsidered by, and integrated into, existing analyses of western punishment.

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Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Italian Penality – Punitiveness and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations