Leib, Körper

Borsche, Tilman; Kaulbach, Friedrich

doi:10.24894/hwph.5238

Cited by 2 publications

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“…1In the phenomenological tradition, the German word Leib stands for the lived/living body in contrast to the body seen from an objective perspective ( Körper ). On the history of these terms, see Borsche and Kaulbach 1980.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12Note that this explication of Leib as referring to the subjective experience of the body is itself historical. Leib generally refers to the body that is “beseelt,” that is, “has a soul” (Borsche and Kaulbach 1980, 16.435). However, it is only since the early modern period that “having a soul” is spelled out in terms of subjectivity (16.450ff.).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity

Neuhann

2023

Hypatia

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The recent debate in feminist philosophy about an adequate concept of woman presupposes the distinction between sex and gender, and most proposals operate on the gender level. Building on Simone de Beauvoir, Toril Moi suggested an account of “woman” that does not rely on the distinction between sex and gender (Moi 1999a). She criticizes that this distinction suggests too strong a separation between the bodily and social dimensions of a person's identity. Instead, her account of “woman” centers around the phenomenological concept of the “body as situation” or the lived/living body (Leib). This understanding of the body emphasizes a person's subjective experience of their own body rather than a third-personal (for example, medical) perspective on humans’ bodies. With her proposal, Moi aims, on the one hand, to resist biological determinism, and, on the other, to avoid the dualism of the sex/gender distinction. In this article, I re-introduce Moi's position to the recent debate and examine how it fares regarding the “inclusion problem” (Katharine Jenkins) toward trans women. I suggest that Moi's account provides resources for an attractive, individualistic, and hence inclusive account of embodied gender identity. For political purposes, however, we also need to analyze concrete contexts of gender-related oppression.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity

Neuhann

2023

Hypatia

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“…14 14 For the history of the distinction between Körper and Leib, see Borsche and Kaulbach (1986). Contrary to Bisol (2011, p. 13), who holds that “Fichte uses the words ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’ almost synonymously,” I believe that in the FNR Fichte makes a sufficiently clear terminological distinction between the two concepts (See FNR, p. 58). …”

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Fichte's conception of the body: The intertwining of sociality and embodiment

Abazari

2022

European J of Philosophy

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While the relation between embodiment and intersubjectivity is often remarked upon in the literature on Fichte, it is not sufficiently acknowledged that for Fichte the two are strongly interdependent. In this paper, by elaborating on his account of the fine structure of the embodied agency, I argue that for Fichte one's relation to one's own body is socially constituted. Further, I show that the usual stricture in the literature, according to which Fichte does not allow for bodily passivity, is misleading. Indeed, as I argue, Fichte's account of embodied agency is sufficiently nuanced as to be able to explain “passive bodily expressions,” that is, those bodily expressions that are not under direct control of the agent. And related to that, contrary to the commonly held view, Fichte does offer a satisfactory account of the more sentient bodily phenomena, such as pain, hunger, and fatigue, which happen to the agent without her being capable of controlling their happening. Indeed, as I will show, for Fichte, these latter phenomena, rather than being simply restrictive of agency, may positively contribute to the exercise of agency.

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Leib, Körper

Cited by 2 publications

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Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity

Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity

Fichte's conception of the body: The intertwining of sociality and embodiment

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