Les déterminants de la représentation des actionnaires salariés au conseil d’administration ou de surveillance

Abstract

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Exclusive Representation of Employee Shareholders in the Board: Issues and Economic Consequences

“…However, if we consider the analysis of (Hollandts, Guedri, & Aubert, 2011), for the same level of financial capital investment, the efficiency of directors representing employee shareholders within control bodies depend on their human capital endowment. Indeed, the importance of human capital, its specificity to the company and its low redeploy ability on the labour market (Blair, Kruse, & Blasi, 2000) play a role in the effectiveness of control by employee shareholders directors.…”

“…Others consider the representation of employee shareholders in the supervisory bodies, as an additional opportunity for the executives rooting (Gamble, 2000;Gharbi & Lepers, 2008;Hollandts, Guedri, & Aubert, 2011).…”

“…The recent study of (Hollandts, Guedri, & Aubert, 2011) sought to determine the history of representation of employee shareholders on the board, confirms the assumption of management rooting.…”

“…Therefore, if one considers that the risk argument is the one which must be used to define a hierarchy shareholder in the company, then the employee shareholders should occupy the top of the hierarchy and therefore have a representation in the decision-making bodies (Hollandts, Guedri, & Aubert, 2011).…”

“…5, No. 12; In this context, a first measure of the effectiveness of control undertaken by representatives of employee shareholders in the board of directors, can be envisaged through a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has at least one director representing employee shareholders from a combination of employee shareholders or a mutual fund share ownership, and 0 in the absence of such a representation (Hollandts, Guedri, & Aubert, 2011). However, the number of employees shareholders directors will be appreciated by a continuous variable (D'Arcimoles & Trébucq, 2003;Hollandts, 2007).…”