Les investisseurs institutionnels étrangers : vers la fin du capitalisme à la française ?

Abstract

The foreign institutional investors : The end of the french capitalism traditional organisation ? The first objective of the crossed shareholding system in the French capitalism organisation was to ensure the large groups of firms a stable shareholding and consequently to protect them from foreign investors. This contribution demonstrates that this kind of interfirms relations organisation is today collapsing because of the huge implementation of foreign institutional investors, especially the Anglo-Saxon pension funds, in the capital of the main firms of the CAC 40. This article points out that the application of the corporate governance principles as well as the financial valorization strategies of these pension funds are in complete opposition with the traditional French capitalism organisation.

Corporate Governance and Information Transparency: A Simultaneous Equations Approach

“…Baudru and Kechidi (1998) suggests that institutional investors can be differ in their behaviour, when the firm characterized by higher percentage of institutional investors. This view is supported by Girard and Rakotonjanahary (2006) who write that institutional investors are more likely to play an active role for the sake of leaders as well as their board's structure.…”

L’évolution de l’actionnariat en France : 1977-2017

“…Repérer les grandes tendances de l'actionnariat est donc essentiel pour saisir les changements à l'oeuvre dans les structures de gouvernance des firmes, ces instances de ratification ou de prise de décisions étant généralement déterminées par les structures de propriété. De nombreuses études ont montré l'évolution spécifique de l'actionnariat des grandes entreprises cotées françaises, notamment lors de la grande rupture de la fin des années 1990 largement exposée dans la Revue d'économie financière (Morin, 1998 ;Baudru et Kechidi, 1998 ;Jeffers, 1998 ;Baudru et Lavigne, 2001 ;Plihon et al 2001) 2 . Cependant, rarement une vision globale sur l'ensemble de l'économie et sur longue période de l'évolution de l'actionnariat a été fournie.…”

The Impact on Long-Term Capital Investment of Accounting and Prudential Standards for European Financial Intermediaries

“…In terms of capital supply, we observe a gap between weak investment and plentiful savings which can revealed an inefficient allocation of savings, resulting from the short-term bias of market participants and the most important financial intermediaries like banks and insurers. On this point, there has been a rough consensus for some time in the academic literature along with growing awareness among finance professionals (Aglietta and Rebérioux [2004], Asker, et al [2015], Baudru and Kechidi [1998], Baudru and Lavigne [2001], Brossard, et al [2013], Orléan [1999]). Larry Fink, the Chairman and Chief Executive of BlackRock, one of the world's leading asset managers, warned in letters sent in 2014, 2015 and 2016 to the CEOs of S&P 500 companies, "We certainly believe that returning cash to shareholders should be part of a balanced capital strategy; however, when done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, it can jeopardise a company's ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.…”