Abstract:Today, the West faces a considerable dilemma in their support for the Washington Consensus as a dominant approach for development because the Beijing model has grown to become an unavoidable process which can only be neglected at the cost of standing on the wrong side of economic history. The Washington Consensus, the hitherto dominant scheme, is being encroached on by the Beijing model. Many African nations are increasingly embracing this later method because the prevailing Western model has failed to deliver… Show more
“…Consistent with Asongu et al (2018), the NEPAD which to this day is acknowledged as the mainstream African consensus may be interpreted to integrate both the BM and the African countries as equal and sovereign partners; this is not the case with some Western nations. Two examples include: the USA's policy in Saudi Arabia that is similar to China's foreign policy and, France's foreign policy in Africa which has not been characterized by her cherished values of equality, fraternity and liberty Asongu & Ssozi, 2016).…”
Section: Agenda: An African Consensus In the Beijing Model And The Wamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, the Chinese foreign policy of unconditional foreign aid greatly deviates from the Western version which patronizes African countries . In this light, the term "colonialism" used by the pessimistic school to qualify Sino-African relations is very misplaced (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013;Asongu et al, 2018). The third stream which is the Accommodation School emphasises that the issue in the classification of schools should not be centred on whether China has colonial ambitions or not.…”
Section: Schools Of Thought and Argumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The success and burgeoning economic prosperity of China over the past decades has led to growing debates in academic and policy making circles over the relevance of the Washington Consensus (WC) in 21 st century development (Asongu et al, 2018) 1 . Narratives have varied from, inter alia: lost decades with the WC (Fofack, 2014); the Beijing Model (BM) more adapted to the 21 st century (Nijs, 2008;Huang, 2010); development strategies based on a mixture of the WC and other successful development strategies (Fosu, 2013a); preferences in economic versus political rights in a development approach (Moyo, 2013); while institutions promote economic growth (Acemoglu et al, 2015(Acemoglu et al, , 2017, institutions could be more endogenous to economic prosperity in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) and; scale of preference in rights between developing and developed countries in the era of globalization (Lalountas et al, 2011;Asongu, 2014a).…”
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the Washington Consensus (WC) and Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature. The challenge is even more demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While the latter has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the development process. We synthesize perspectives from recently published papers on development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper postulates for a unified theory by reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities respectively. By attempting to reconcile the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at different stages of the process of development.
“…Consistent with Asongu et al (2018), the NEPAD which to this day is acknowledged as the mainstream African consensus may be interpreted to integrate both the BM and the African countries as equal and sovereign partners; this is not the case with some Western nations. Two examples include: the USA's policy in Saudi Arabia that is similar to China's foreign policy and, France's foreign policy in Africa which has not been characterized by her cherished values of equality, fraternity and liberty Asongu & Ssozi, 2016).…”
Section: Agenda: An African Consensus In the Beijing Model And The Wamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, the Chinese foreign policy of unconditional foreign aid greatly deviates from the Western version which patronizes African countries . In this light, the term "colonialism" used by the pessimistic school to qualify Sino-African relations is very misplaced (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013;Asongu et al, 2018). The third stream which is the Accommodation School emphasises that the issue in the classification of schools should not be centred on whether China has colonial ambitions or not.…”
Section: Schools Of Thought and Argumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The success and burgeoning economic prosperity of China over the past decades has led to growing debates in academic and policy making circles over the relevance of the Washington Consensus (WC) in 21 st century development (Asongu et al, 2018) 1 . Narratives have varied from, inter alia: lost decades with the WC (Fofack, 2014); the Beijing Model (BM) more adapted to the 21 st century (Nijs, 2008;Huang, 2010); development strategies based on a mixture of the WC and other successful development strategies (Fosu, 2013a); preferences in economic versus political rights in a development approach (Moyo, 2013); while institutions promote economic growth (Acemoglu et al, 2015(Acemoglu et al, , 2017, institutions could be more endogenous to economic prosperity in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) and; scale of preference in rights between developing and developed countries in the era of globalization (Lalountas et al, 2011;Asongu, 2014a).…”
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the Washington Consensus (WC) and Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature. The challenge is even more demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While the latter has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the development process. We synthesize perspectives from recently published papers on development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper postulates for a unified theory by reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities respectively. By attempting to reconcile the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at different stages of the process of development.
“…The expression is only mentioned by the Chinese government in the early 21st century, after 2004 and 2005. With globalization and the increasing insertion of China in the international capitalist economy, in particular after joining the WTO, economic diplomacy has gradually become an important component of its diplomatic activity (Hucheng, 2014; see also Asongu, Nwachukwu, & Aminkeng, 2018). Regarding China's model of economic diplomacy, Jing Men (2013, p. 297–298) explains the difficulty in tracing its exact outline, as there is no official definition of the term and its explicit use was relatively late:While economic diplomacy appears more frequently in the official documents in China in recent years, Beijing has never defined what «economic diplomacy» is.…”
Section: An Economic Diplomacy (Un)like All Others (Trade and Investment As Political Tools)mentioning
The main purpose of this article is a brief analysis of China and its economic diplomacy regarding Portugal, as a Member State of the European Union. The analysis was developed throughout several points. First, the Chinese model of socialist market economy within a global environment configured by liberal ideas. Second, the main characteristics of China's economic diplomacy model, one where the economic and the political are closely intertwined. Third, a focus on the economic attractiveness that China exerts upon Portugal, in particular, the Chinese investment in the Portuguese energy sector. Finally, some conclusions about the possible consequences for Portugal economic and strategic dependence on China in a world where the US‐China rivalry is growing.
“…Sino-African engagement in general and Sino-Sudan in particular is considered in terms of quest for energy resources encompassing: control over raw-capital (Westphal, 2017), domination over natural resources (Mearsheimer, 2016), hold over flea-market, and competitive gains over industrial productions. Furthermore, the existing deliberation to value Sino-Sudan associations, expressively relates the realist explanations, therefore symbolizes China's strategic interests as decisive by guarding its economic securities (Oil & Gold), persuading protection of its energy requirements, largely related to geo-political and geo-strategic struggle in the area (Asongu et al, 2018). Consequently, China factor in politico-economic relationships with Sudan appears as self-regarded empowerment that is rescuing raw-capital for home-industry.…”
China has recognized a more far-reaching factor in Sudan for the last two decades and so, during that it has developed into a blend of lasting ferocious inner volatility and prolonged outward misfortune that has described the political affairs of the central government since 1989. China factor among two inter-linked politico-economic trajectories of Sino-Sudan engagements is studied in this research article. The foremost concerns China’s relationships with Sudan’s national government in integrating China into its national political affairs and international relations over long established crisis in Darfur region of Sudan, to which China has reacted over a more affianced political character. The other provokes the practical precincts of China’s independence principle and limited dependence over dealings with the Sudan’s national government. Following the uncertain events since 2003 in Darfur, China has established a new relationship with Sudan, thus pursuing to place herself to circumnavigate Sudan’s crisis. This research article effort to review a specific context of China factor in Sudan crisis with more focus over the recent politico-economic engagement with Sudan.
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