Lessons From Astronomy and Biology for the Mind—Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience

Abstract

Neuroscience made major progress in unravelling the neural basis of mental features like self, consciousness, affect, etc. However, we nevertheless lack what recently has been described as “missing ingredient” or “common currency” in the relationship between neuronal and mental activity. Rather than putting forward yet another theory of the neural basis of mental features, I here suggest a change in our methodological strategy how to approach the brain, that is, our view or vantage point of the brain. Learning from astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin), I suggest that we may want to change our currently pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. Such post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain itself, e.g., the world, and how that shapes the brain and its neural activity, e.g., world-brain relation. We then lend empirical support to the world-brain relation by converging it with Karl Friston’s free energy principle that, as we see it, provides a neuro-ecological and therefore post-Copernican view of the brain. That, in turn, allows us taking into view that mental features are shaped by both world and brain and are therefore truly neuro-ecological rather than merely neuronal. This raises the question for the link, e.g., the “missing ingredient” or “common currency” of world brain relation and mental features. Recent empirical evidence suggests that temporo-spatial dynamics may provide such link as it characterizes both the world-brain relation’s free energy and mental features, e.g., their spatiotemporality as described in philosophy. Taken together, I here advocate a change in our methodological strategy on how to approach the brain, that is, a shift from a pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. The latter allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain in the world and how that shapes the brain in such a way that it can yield mental features. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican turn or revolution in neuroscience akin to the ones in astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin).

What is neurophilosophy: Do we need a non-reductive form?

“…Non-reductive neurophilosophy, however, takes both neuroscience and philosophy seriously for any field of investigation, e.g. in respect to the self (Northoff 2014b(Northoff , 2016c(Northoff , 2018b(Northoff , 2019a, therefrom reflecting a brain-based stance and cooperative naturalism form of the naturalization of philosophy (rather than a brain-reductive and replacement naturalistic stance). In conclusion, non-reductive neurophilosophy does not stand in competition with neuroscience and philosophy, instead, its approach should be seen as complementary to genuine particular sciences and it especially preserves philosophy alive by actively considering and taking philosophical concepts into the interdisciplinary investigation, that is, both as input and output.…”

“…Considering the four main principles relevant to the connection of neuroscience with philosophy as listed in part 1 and Table 1, non-reductive neurophilosophy, first of all, represents the cooperative naturalism type of the naturalization of philosophy; i.e., philosophical branches and their respective concepts are not reduced to the empirical realm of neuroscience. Northoff's (2004Northoff's ( , 2014aNorthoff's ( , b, c, 2018bNorthoff's ( , 2019a approach applies a bidirectional connection of both sciences. Philosophical concepts require empirical evidence; i.e., concepts need to be established on the empirical level within natural conditions.…”

“…Instead of the common entity and property-based ontologies, structure-or process-based ontologies may better reflect the empirical reality of the brain's functionality. Recent neuroscien-tific findings speak in favor of a neuro-ecological structure of the brain's empirical reality, which accounts for the concept of»World-brain relation« (Northoff 2018b(Northoff , 2019a. 5 Most basically, the brain's temporo-spatial structure of its spontaneous activity's dynamics has to align itself to the wider temporo-spatial context of the world on adaptational grounds.…”

“…5 Most basically, the brain's temporo-spatial structure of its spontaneous activity's dynamics has to align itself to the wider temporo-spatial context of the world on adaptational grounds. Such constant alignment of the brain to the world virtually spans the temporo-spatial structure across the brain, body, and environment, hence reflecting a neuro-ecological structure (Northoff 2013a(Northoff , 2018b(Northoff , 2019aNorthoff and Huang 2017). The brain's neuro-ecological structure and world-brain relation require relational based ontologies instead of entity-based ontologies.…”

Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended Conscious Mind

“… Cosmelli and Thompson (2010) have argued for the constitutive dependence of consciousness on the non-neural body and world by calling into question brain-in-vat intuitions. Northoff (2019) can also be read as arguing for an account of consciousness as partially constituted by factors beyond the brain. Our argument will, however, differ from these important exponents of ECM.…”