Lessons from Nigeria for improved thinking and working politically in the extractives sector

Abstract

Despite the wealth that comes from being the biggest oil producer in Africa, Nigeria has some of the worst development indicators in the world. From 2011 to mid‐2016, the DFID‐funded Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) programme's unique design aimed to reduce incentives for the capture of oil revenue by elites and international oil companies, restoring the potential of those revenues to accelerate economic and social development. This article asks what lessons FOSTER's successes and failures offer for improved “thinking and working politically” (TWP). It examines the outcomes from five “clusters” of interventions: three viewed by the FOSTER team as successes and two as failures. The article identifies factors for successful TWP‐based programming, including the need for local ownership rooted in staff with a combination of technical expertise, a deep knowledge of the local political context and excellent networking abilities. The research used a qualitative and inductive approach. Field research was undertaken with 44 semi‐structured qualitative interviews during one month of fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos. The research also included reviews of FOSTER's internal documentation and evaluation frameworks, as well as analysis of newspaper articles and grey literature on the oil sector in Nigeria. The project offers important lessons for politically informed programming about how interventions were implemented (process), what was actually done (content) and how the project responded to changes in context that created or blocked opportunities for reform (responsiveness). The article identifies factors for successful TWP‐based programming, including the need for local ownership rooted in staff with a combination of technical expertise, a deep knowledge of the local political context and excellent networking abilities. The findings have important implications for programme design. They demonstrate the value of built‐in flexibility that allows staff to choose and switch the partners they work with and the channels they work through. They also show that a key aspect of TWP‐based programming is implicit acceptance that some failure may be unavoidable, since this permits staff to balance risk against opportunities. Finally, a better understanding of FOSTER's failures reveals the challenges of a TWP‐based approach and the trade‐offs it demands.

Extractive sector governance: does a nexus of accountability render local extractive industries transparency initiatives ineffective?

“…NEITI plays a role in fostering accountability, but the limitations of this role must be realistically understood. An understanding of this role can be seen in Lopez Lucia et al (2019, p. 18), who identify NEITI as one of the critical “demand side accountability actors” engaged as part of the broader UK-DFID-funded Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) program. While we do not advocate FOSTER program as an ideal, the program does illustrate how NEITI can be understood as part of a larger political strategy for change.…”

To go with or against the grain? Politics as practice in the Budget Strengthening Initiative, Uganda

“…Interestingly, the positionality of the BSI also distinguishes it from features that have been found to promote success in other TWP cases. For instance, in their analysis of the FOSTER programme in Nigeria, Lopez Lucia et al (2018) highlight the value of ‘built‐in flexibility that allows staff to choose and switch the partners they work with and the channels they work through’ (2018: 017) in response to political strategy. Indeed, in shaping governance arrangements, the experience of the BSI programme indicates that contextual embeddedness both supported and constrained its ability to support pro‐poor outcomes in Uganda.…”

Risk navigation for Thinking and Working Politically: The work and disappearance of Sombath Somphone

“…Similarly, the applicability of TWP is not limited to projects with solely political aims. Rather, TWP can be-and has been-applied across a range of interventions, including social cash transfers, supporting peace processes, stimulating economic growth, addressing pre-trial detention, climate change mitigation and industrial policy reform | 609 SIMS (Booth, 2016;Denney & Barron, 2015;Domingo & Sudaryono, 2016;Harris, 2016;Harrison & Kostka, 2019;Hickey & Bukenya, 2019;Lucia et al, 2019).…”

“…On the other hand, if they voice dissent too boldly, or in ways that are deemed too antagonistic, they may also heighten the level of risk for domestic actors. TWP's repeated calls for local ownership of development interventions (Lucia et al, 2019;McCulloch & Piron, 2019) must be alert to these challenges, and be informed by deep, contextually informed, political knowledge.…”