Lessons Learned? The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Lack of Local Legitimacy and Its Implications

Abstract

The experiences of many transitional justice mechanisms have led to a general consensus on the central importance of local legitimacy and local ownership; this indeed is repeatedly avowed by both the UN and the EU in their prescriptions on effective transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, I argue that the Kosovo Specialist Chambers was established in the absence of both. The court was not created in response to domestic pressure from within Kosovo; rather, it was the result of external pressure which by definition compromised local ownership and legitimacy. Drawing on the findings from first-hand qualitative research, I demonstrate that the court's local legitimacy has not improved since its establishment. This lack of legitimacy, I argue, has potentially negative implications as, without popular legitimacy, the court's proceedings and judgements are unlikely to command sufficient public support to either catalyse the societal changes promised by the court's external sponsors, or withstand opposition to the court from within the Kosovo Albanian population resulting from any perceived slight against the 'heroic' KLA.

Kosovo’s Competing Nationalisms: Theorizing an Internal Challenge to Rebel Victor Legitimacy

“…Ramush Haradinaj resigned as Prime Minister (2005) and Hashim Thaçi as president (2020) to do so. On the other hand, those same leaders encourage narratives that these mechanisms, including their most recent incarnation as the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), are nothing other than an international attempt to denigrate their war heroes, rather than the result of rigorous international investigations into the crimes committed during the conflict of the 1990s (Hehir 2019, 275–276). The upshot is that any prosecutions will “provoke outrage,” increasing the popularity of the target (Hehir 2019, 282).…”

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans: Approaches, Impacts and Challenges

“…In Croatia and Kosovo, governments also pledged to prosecute war crimes in front of domestic courts, while North Macedonia received referral cases from the ICTY to prosecute cases in domestic courts (Subotic, 2015). In 2015, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers was established by the Kosovo Assembly, tasked with investigating crimes allegedly committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (Hehir, 2019).…”

“…Despite high expectations for the impacts of criminal trials, the ICTY's record of achieving justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia has been criticised, with many studies concluding that it either failed to promote reconciliation, or hindered this process (Strupinskienė, 2020;see Hehir, 2019). A key issue cited in the literature is that the ICTY lacked local legitimacy, due in large part to its physical distance from the former Yugoslavia and the lack of engagement with people on the ground (Hehir, 2019). Local populations perceived the work of the ICTY as distant and abstract, even if their overall impression may have been positive (Zyberi & Letnar Černič, 2015).…”

“…In Serbia, the political scene became split between nationalist, anti-Hague forces on the one hand, and pro-Hague groups and individuals on the other, which had a significant negative influence on reconciliation (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2015). Nationalist politicians throughout the region have in some cases gained greater support after being sanctioned by the ICTY (Hehir, 2019). Conflicting reactions to verdicts, such as to the conviction of Radovan Karadžic, also demonstrate how divided the region remainsand how elusive a shared narrative can be (Milatovic-Ovadia, 2016).…”

The Kosovo war and the Washington Post: Bombings and alignments

“… 8. In ‘the dominant narrative of the past in Kosovo’, the KLA ‘is understood as a liberation force that fought for justice and independence from decades of brutal Serbian oppression’ (Subotić, 2014: 171; see also Hehir, 2019: 281). Boduszyński and Pavlaković (2019: 821) argue that ‘the culture of victory has meant state capture by a group of former rebel fighters who converted their liberation role into political and economic power.’ …”