Let’s Not Stick Together: Anticipation of Cartel and Merger Control in The Netherlands

Baarsma, B.; Kemp, Ron; Noll, R. van der; Seldeslachts, Jo

doi:10.1007/s10645-012-9193-x

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Sources: Baarsma et al 2012;CMA 2014. a. A qualified merger is a merger over which the U.K. competition authority could take jurisdiction.…”

Section: Measurement Of Deterrent Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power and Wealth Distribution

Ennis¹,

Kim²

2017

A Step Ahead: Competition Policy for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth

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Note: Based on the $1.25 poverty line and 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices, as full distributional data using 2011 PPP prices were not yet available. Competition policy tools Competition Pillar 1 Market regulation and sectoral policiesPillar 2 Competition enforcement and policies on state aid and competitive neutrality Economic growth Poverty reduction and shared prosperity Dynamic effects Direct effectsLevel and distribution of household welfare

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“…Sources: Baarsma et al 2012;CMA 2014. a. A qualified merger is a merger over which the U.K. competition authority could take jurisdiction.…”

Section: Measurement Of Deterrent Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Power and Wealth Distribution

Ennis¹,

Kim²

2017

A Step Ahead: Competition Policy for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth

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“…In line with this intuition, the Deloitte and Touche (2007) study for the UK Office of Fair Trading provides evidence via surveys that UK merger policy rarely deters pro-competitive mergers. More recently, Baarsma et al (2012) completed a similar survey for the Dutch antitrust authority and confirmed this point regarding the rarity of pro-competitive mergers being deterred. Additionally, Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) find that changes in the tenor of US merger policy affect future horizontal merger activity but do not affect future non-horizontal merger activity.…”

Section: A Deterrence Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 68%

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Clougherty

Duso

Lee³

et al. 2015

SSRN Journal

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We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as-unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions-phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cutoff level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries. (JEL K21, K40, L40) * Corresponding author. For helpful comments and suggestions, we wish to thank Jozsef Molnar from DG-Comp and participants at the Barcelona IO Workshop, European Commission's DG-Comp, IIOC in Chicago, IFO Institute in Munich, MaCCI Conference in Mannheim, TILEC seminar at Tilburg University, and University of Alicante. 2

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“…Even the presence of a competition law and enforcement agency functions as a deterrent against anticompetitive behaviour. These previously mentioned factors all positively affect economic growth (Baarsma et al, 2012;Don et al, 2008;OECD, 2014). This lends further support to the perfect-market perspective over the free-market perspective.…”

Section: Conclusion and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free-Market, Perfect Market and Welfare State Perspectives on “Good” Markets: an Empirical Test

Graafland

Verbruggen

2021

Applied Research Quality Life

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This study explores the relationship between human development and market institutions and tests the performance of three alternative economic perspectives that each assign a different role to governments. In the free-market perspective, the principal task of the government is to protect property rights. In the perfect-market perspective, the government has the additional responsibility of correcting market failures. The welfare-state perspective posits that the state must actively adopt welfare-state policies across a broad range of fields. Based on a sample of 34 OECD countries plus Russia across a time frame spanning 1990 to 2018, the results demonstrate that economic freedom and small size of government do not significantly affect human development as measured by the Human Development Index. Hence, we find no support for the free-market ideal. Conversely, it is found that human development is positively related to governmental interventions that aim to reduce externalities (public expenditure on education and environmental regulation). These results support the perfect-market perspective. With respect to the welfare-state perspective, the findings are mixed. On the one hand, we found that (some) labor market regulations (particularly hiring and firing regulations, hours regulations and mandated cost of worker dismissal) have a negative impact upon human development. On the other hand, human development is shown to be positively affected by governmental intervention seeking to reduce gender stratification in the labor market.

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Let’s Not Stick Together: Anticipation of Cartel and Merger Control in The Netherlands

Cited by 9 publications

References 21 publications

Market Power and Wealth Distribution

Market Power and Wealth Distribution

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Free-Market, Perfect Market and Welfare State Perspectives on “Good” Markets: an Empirical Test

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