Blank-slate theories of human intelligence propose that reasoning is carried out by general-purpose operations applied uniformly across contents. An evolutionary approach implies a radically different model of human intelligence. The task demands of different adaptive problems select for functionally specialized problem-solving strategies, unleashing massive increases in problem-solving power for ancestrally recurrent adaptive problems. Because exchange can evolve only if cooperators can detect cheaters, we hypothesized that the human mind would be equipped with a neurocognitive system specialized for reasoning about social exchange. Whereas humans perform poorly when asked to detect violations of most conditional rules, we predicted and found a dramatic spike in performance when the rule specifies an exchange and violations correspond to cheating. According to critics, people's uncanny accuracy at detecting violations of social exchange rules does not reflect a cheater detection mechanism, but extends instead to all rules regulating when actions are permitted (deontic conditionals). Here we report experimental tests that falsify these theories by demonstrating that deontic rules as a class do not elicit the search for violations. We show that the cheater detection system functions with pinpoint accuracy, searching for violations of social exchange rules only when these are likely to reveal the presence of someone who intends to cheat. It does not search for violations of social exchange rules when these are accidental, when they do not benefit the violator, or when the situation would make cheating difficult.evolutionary psychology | reasoning | cooperation | reciprocation T o the human mind, certain things seem intuitively correct. The world seems flat and motionless; objects seem solid rather than composed of empty space, fields, and wave functions; space seems Euclidian and 3-dimensional rather than curved and 11-dimensional. Because scientists are equipped with human minds, they often take intuitive propositions for granted and import them-unexaminedinto their scientific theories. Because they seem so self-evidently true, it can take centuries before these intuitive assumptions are questioned and, under the cumulative weight of evidence, discarded in favor of counterintuitive alternatives-a spinning earth orbiting the sun, quantum mechanics, relativity.For psychology and the cognitive sciences, the intuitive view of human intelligence and rationality-the blank-slate theory of the mind-may be just such a case of an intuition-fueled failure to grapple with evidence (1-4). According to intuition, intelligence-almost by definition-seems to be the ability to reason successfully about almost any topic. If we can reason about any content, from cabbages to kings, it seems self-evident that intelligence must operate by applying inference procedures that operate uniformly regardless of the content domains they are applied to (such procedures are general-purpose, domain-general, and content-independent). Consulting su...