Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?

The Isolated Islamists: The Case of the Allied Democratic Forces in the Ugandan-Congolese Borderland

“…52 In some cases, the Al-Qaeda core has also been concerned about the excessively violent tendencies of certain affiliates and urged groups such as the AQI and the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) to be more discriminate in target selection. 53 Moderate Salafi groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood rejects violence "outside of carefully defined domains" and has unequivocally denounced the 9/11 attacks as well as other violent incidents carried out by Al-Qaeda and affiliates. 54 The extent of engagement with existing political institutions has also caused discord amongst Jihadists.…”

A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and its Consequences for Leadership Targeting)

“…114 according to internal al-Qaeda documents, was struggling to keep affiliated organizations true to their original vision up until the time of his death. 115 Operationally, bin Laden reportedly initially controlled many of the strategic, tactical, and organizational decisions. Strategically, attacking the far enemy had to be justified because many felt that attacking the West would prove counterproductive.…”

Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa'ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary

“…4 Based on declassified documents captured from Usama bin Ladin's compound in Abbottabad, it is evident that Harun's sentiments were not isolated. The internal its members who were schooled in its training camps and are close to its senior leaders; how its pragmatic approach to religious interpretation and rejection of regionalism, ethnocentrism and sectarianism led to its strategic success of attracting recruits from different regions and theological persuasions and turning them into "jihadis without borders," 8 as Harun describes himself and his fellow al-Qa`ida members; and why takfiris, those jihadis who are inflexible in their interpretation of religion and rush to declare fellow Muslims to be unbelievers, are a liability to al-Qa`ida and to jihadism broadly.…”

“…On 7 June 2011 Fadil Harun was shot and killed by Somali government forces when, according to media reports, he and his companion, Musa Husayn, refused to stop at a checkpoint in Mogadishu. 8 His death occurred just over a month after that of Bin Ladin name Fazul, perhaps because his grandfather's Arabic name is "Fadil" but it is written and pronounced as "Fazul" in Indian: Vol. 1, 17.…”

“…As early as 1996, the CIA had set up a unit specifically tasked with monitoring Usama bin Ladin; see chapter 4, The 9/11 Commission Report, 109; http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html (accessed 18 July 2011). 8 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Somalis Kill Mastermind of 2 U.S. Embassy Bombings," The New York Times, 11 June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/africa/12somalia.html (accessed 19 August 2011). and, it may not have been as accidental as it was reported.…”