Level of agency in sub-clinical checking

Abstract

a b s t r a c tThis study examined cognitive representations of routine action, through the assessment of level of agency, in individuals with sub-clinical checking. The level of agency stems from Action Identification Theory [Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal agency: Individual variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 660-671], which states that how actions are usually identified (based on instrumental aspects or purpose) reflects the predominant accessibility of internal representation (movements executed vs. goal pursued). Furthermore, this framework proposed that altered action regulation is related to low-level of agency (i.e., action identification at an instrumental level). In the current study, the main result indicated that checking symptoms were related to a low-level of agency, that is, individuals with sub-clinical checking identified habitual actions on the basis of instrumental aspects. This seems to indicate that checkers may act with a lack of goal representations. The results are discussed in terms of the role of low-level of agency in checking phenomena and related cognitive dysfunction.

Feeling of doing in obsessive–compulsive checking

“…First, our interpretation of the nature of the relationship found between experienced agency and checking symptoms is limited, as we did not control for the potential confounding effect of other factors, such as dissociation, anxiety, and attentional focus. For example, dissociative states, which are frequently associated with checking (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;Rufer, Fricke, Held, Cremer, & Hand, 2006), can reduce awareness of action by altering the integration of action representations (e.g., expected effects) and the ''present self in action" (e.g., observed outcomes) (Ansfield & Wegner, 1996). Furthermore, several studies have emphasized the importance of attention focused on representations related to goals, expected effects or intention in action awareness, as compared to attention focused on movements (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004).…”

Individual differences in cognitive representations of action influence the activation of goal concepts

“…Indeed, the level of action identification has been implicated in several psychopathological symptoms, including obsessive-compulsive behaviors (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;Dar & Katz, 2005), autistic traits (Marsh et al, 2010) and impulsivity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For example, people with checking symptoms have been related to a low level of action identification (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). A lack of goal identification in checking individuals could explain the diminished sense of goal completion they frequently experience and their need to repeat actions regardless of the obvious achievement of the goal.…”

“…Based on reported evidence that the level of action identification may influence symptoms and mechanisms implied in various psychopathological symptoms, Watkins (2011) suggested that defective action identification may be a transdiagnostic process across psychological disorders. Indeed, the level of action identification has been implicated in several psychopathological symptoms, including obsessive-compulsive behaviors (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;Dar & Katz, 2005), autistic traits (Marsh et al, 2010) and impulsivity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For example, people with checking symptoms have been related to a low level of action identification (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009).…”

“…Because performing habitual actions with unavailable or irrelevant goal representations may simply disorganize the action flow, people characterized by a low level of action identification, that is, mainly focused on the movement parameters and mechanistic aspects of action, are more prone to ineffectiveness in everyday actions (e.g., emergence of new courses of action, more attention focused on details of performance, doubts about whether the action has been completed; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). They may also have difficulties in understanding events regarding goal features (e.g., Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). By contrast, by focusing on the abstract goals and implications of behaviors, people with a high level of action identification tend to have greater overall efficiency in everyday actions (e.g., less disruption, fewer resources needed and better goal completion in everyday behaviors) and have greater facility in perceiving other's intention and goal.…”

“…Thus, it is possible that people with a chronic low level of action identification may be characterized by an impairment of the automatic activation or accessibility of goal representations. It is often suggested that people with a chronic low level of action identification may be characterized by an undermined ability to activate or keep goal representations in mind during action processing (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;Vallacher & Wegner, 1989;Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984).…”