“…Two key issues that arise in the work of Pierce et al merit further discussion: the use of analytic methods to evaluate the possible effects of hypothetical interventions that are not themselves well defined, and the promises and pitfalls of research findings derived from observational studies relative to those extracted from randomized clinical trials. In their analysis of the Swedish registry data, these authors consider how the associations—or, under well-studied assumptions, the causal effects—of “preventing childhood adversity could provide notable improvements in the rates of common mental disorders.” While informative, an important next step in any impactful analysis would be to formulate a set of well-specified interventions that could be carried out in practice and frame an analysis in terms of such well-defined counterfactual contrasts. For example, the authors found that preventing parental separation provided for the greatest improvement, yet such a vague intervention constitutes not only a violation of the consistency rule in causal inference but also fails to suggest a plausible intervention (eg, marriage counseling to prevent parental separation), which may yet fail in practice; thus, one is left to interpret the substantive results of this hypothetical analysis in terms of implausible interventions (eg, marriage counseling that can never fail).…”