As the economy has grown increasingly financialized, the relationship between financial innovation and instability has attracted more attention. Previous research finds that the proliferation of complex financial innovations, like asset securitization and new financial derivatives, helped to erode the market governance arrangements that kept excessive bank risk-taking in check, inviting instability. This article presents an alternative way of understanding how financial innovations and market governance arrangements combine to shape instability. Market governance arrangements also shape how financial firms receive innovations, leading to greater or lesser instability at particular times and places. I illustrate this argument by tracing the effects of changing corporate governance arrangements at large US banks in the 1990s and 2000s. Like non-financial firms in the preceding decade, banks adopted reforms associated with the shareholder value model of corporate governance. These changes to internal bank governance arrangements affected the agendas of bank executives in ways that encouraged expanded use of securitization and derivatives. Drawing from this case, I argue that a full understanding of instability in the financialized era requires closer attention to the (institutionally-structured) interests of financial innovation users-not just to features of financial innovations themselves. Keywords Bank risk-taking. Corporate governance of banks. Financial derivatives. Financialization of banking. Securitization. Shareholder value management Increasing bank reliance on complex financial innovations is a hallmark of the recent turn towards financialization (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; van der Zwan 2014; Cetorelli et al. 2012). Prior to the 1980s, US banks made most of their money from traditional banking activities, like accepting deposits, making loans to consumers and businesses,