Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints

Abstract

In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D47, D78.

Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers

“…His model allows more general forms of interactions across slots than Kominers and Sönmez (2016) allow. However, Westkamp (2013) does not allow the variation in contractual terms, which is necessary for applications such as cadet-branch matching (Switzer and Sönmez, 2013 and Sönmez, 2013), admissions for publicly funded educational institutions and government sponsored jobs in India (Aygün and Turhan, 2017, 2018, and 2020), and airline upgrade allocation (Kominers and Sönmez, 2016).…”

Mechanism Design Approach to School Choice: One versus Many

“…Note that the Boston school district describes its diversity policy to the public by referring to the choice rule of one school, rather than referring to the assignment mechanism which is the SOSM where each school is endowed with a choice rule as described above. To further justify why the current policy is a good policy to achieve diversity, a natural way to proceed is to discover desirable properties underlying the choice rules of the schools in Boston, which we address in Dogan et al (2017).…”