Both “populism” and “populist” have long been considered ill-defined
terms, and therefore are regularly misapplied in both scholarly and
popular discourses.1 This definitional difficulty is exacerbated by the Babelian
confusion of voices on populism, where the term’s meaning differs
within and between global regions (e.g. Latin America versus Western Europe);
time periods (e.g. 1930s versus the present), and classifications (e.g. left/
right, authoritarian/libertarian, pluralist/antipluralist, as well as strains
that muddy these distinctions such as homonationalism, xenophobic
feminism and multicultural neonationalism). While useful efforts have
been made to navigate the vast and heterogeneous conceptual terrain
of populism,2 they rarely engage with each other. The result is a dizzying
proliferation of different definitions unaccompanied by an understanding
as to how they might speak to each other. And this conceptual
fragmentation reinforces, and is reinforced by, diverging assessments of
populism which tend to cast it as either “good” or “bad” for democracy
(e.g. Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Müller 2015).